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Traditionally, classical and neo-classical economists considered technology not as an 
economic phenomenon but rather a scientific one that exogenously affected firm decisions. 
The focus of these economic theories was to achieve a stable equilibrium through the efficient 
allocation of a given set of resources1 and the determination of price.2 The cornerstone of 
analysis here is the diminishing returns concept3 where such accounting enables static 
efficiency.  
 
Static efficiency aims at continuous improvements within a fixed set of initial conditions, e.g. 
by cutting costs, streamlining processes, efficient resource allocation and so on where the only 
adjustments occur from changes in prices and quantities. Consumers thus, greatly benefit 
from reduced prices and increased variety. In other words, the economy is constantly pushed 
towards smooth and continuous adjustments to reach the equilibrium state in the short run 
interrupted intermittently along its path by transient technological advances.  
 
Schumpeter (1911, 1942), however postulated that technology was endogenous to the 
economic system. He suggested that the economy was not continuously striving for a stable 
and static equilibrium i.e., static efficiency, but instead constantly changing through 
innovation i.e., dynamic efficiency. Through dynamic efficiency, initial conditions are 
constantly being changed leading to a very different set of gains, which in turn affect future 
investment and innovation structures. He referred to this phenomenon as creative 
 
1 Efficiency in allocation is referred to as Pareto-optimality where no situation exists in which one person can be 
made better off without making someone else worse off. 
2 By assuming free market entry, it implies that firms are price takers with no influence on the market level of 
prices. Competition is purely price based. Hence the market forces enable easy and automatic adjustments to 
reach the static equilibrium.  
3 Diminishing returns suggest that past a certain point, further increases of inputs lead to less output than the last 
unit of input did. In other words, the cost of producing an additional unit is higher than that of the previous unit 
i.e., increased marginal costs.  
4 Schumpeter (1942) defined creative destruction as a “process of industrial mutation that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new 
one.” In other words, he postulated that economic growth is driven by actual or potential competition which led 




Schumpeter placed great relevance on the ability of entrepreneurs, who he believed were 
driven by monopoly profits, to search out new ways of doing things. Thus, he conjectured that 
innovation was the result of competition, unlike the neo-classical economists who focussed 
only on price competition. Dynamic competition thus eroded the old norm and created new 
forms of industrial organization enabling economic growth and increased overall output.  
 
As an extension to Schumpeter’s approach, in the late 1980s, Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) 
showed that technology was central to economic growth and could be studied using 
mainstream economics. New growth theory or endogenous growth theory suggests that 
technological progress is a product of economic activity i.e., technology is endogenous to the 
economic system. The changes occurring in the economy as a result are not smooth and 
continuous but instead tend to be abrupt and create un-even developments – through new 
market leaders, products and new forms of industrial organization. The main departure here 
from neo-classical economic analyses is the emphasis on knowledge and the fact that 
knowledge generates increasing returns to scale and economic growth (Cortright, 2001). 
Another central aspect of endogenous theory is the focus on knowledge spillovers. The theory 
recognizes that knowledge is not completely excludable and non-rival, hence third parties can 
benefit from a firm’s ideas. This aspect will be explored further in the subsequent sections.  
 
Present day economic growth is attributed in a large part to technological progress and 
innovation in the industrial organization literature (Boldrin and Levine, 2004). High-tech 
knowledge based industries such as software, semiconductors and biotechnology have shown 
immense innovative activity and increasing returns to scale. Such industries normally exhibit 
monopolistic competition where competition is based on innovative developments visible 
through changes in the quality or features of a product and not on price (Bresnahan and 
Greenstein, 1999). These industries experience continuous innovation and make large costly 
investments in research and development (R&D) creating technological improvements that 
often render parts of existing knowledge obsolete. Such competition can be likened to 
Schumpeter’s creative destruction concept. This concept seems highly relevant to broaden our 
understanding of these markets (Howitt, 2007).  
 
In technology based markets, situations of static efficiency are periodically replaced by new 
technology winners with improved technology. For example, in the software industry, the 




                                                
WordPerfect, only to be supplanted by Microsoft several years later.5 Dynamic efficiency, 
characterized by increasing returns to scale and growth, thus seems to be in conflict with 
situations of perfect competition and static efficiency. Seen from the Schumpeterian 
perspective, technology based markets exhibit a trade off between static efficiency today and 
achieving long run efficiency tomorrow through optimal investment in R&D and innovation 
(Carlton and Gertner, 2002). To further understand the implication of Schumpeter’s 
postulations on present day knowledge industries, we examine his two broad contributions in 
the following section.  
 
1.1 Schumpeter 
Schumpeter’s work can be broadly divided in to Schumpeter 1911 and Schumpeter 1942. In 
1911, Schumpeter published the Theory of Economic Development: In this work he put forth 
the idea that small and medium sized enterprises (SME), outside the “circular flow” of 
existing production, are the primary source of innovative activity (Scherer, 1992). However, 
thirty years later, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), he advanced the well 
known hypothesis that large firms with substantial market power are better suited for and able 
to accelerate innovative activity.  
 
Schumpeter (1942), it is said, developed the idea that large firms with substantial market 
power are highly relevant for technological progress based on the merger wave at the turn of 
the century (Nicholas, 2003). He believed that dynamic efficiency with all its benefits i.e., 
increased rewards to society in terms of new technological improvements and increased 
standards of living would, outweigh the welfare losses created by temporary monopolies. 
Hence, he believed this provided a rationale for no government intervention. The intuition for 
his logic lies in dynamic efficiency where monopoly power is constantly challenged by 
competition from entrants who change the existing equilibrium state through new technology, 
giving way to new market leaders. Thus Schumpeter advocated that temporary static 
inefficiencies should be tolerated for the greater good of dynamic efficiency. 
 
The biggest departure from his earlier work in 1911 comes from the change in perspective 
regarding market structures most suited to technological progress. However, the two 
 





                                                
viewpoints are not entirely in disaccord with one another when considering the idea of 
creative destruction, where new firms may take over or dominate the market, is present in 
both works (Nicholas, 2003).  
 
Much of research thus far has focussed on Schumpeter’s 1942 assertion that large firms with 
substantial market power are required for rapid technological progress. Theoretically it has 
been shown that market power stimulates innovative activity based on firms’ expectations of 
monopoly profits (Aghion and Hewitt, 1992, Caballero and Jaffe, 1993, Aghion et al., 2001). 
Aghion et al., (2001) using a panel of UK firms find that firms that are engaged in intensive 
competition tend to increase overall innovation. Hence confirming the existence of 
Schumpeterian type innovation based competition. However, they also caution that in 
industries that exhibit unequal development, excessive competition would reduce the 
incentive to innovate particularly as new entrants would perceive a reduction in post-entry 
profits. 
 
While Scherer (1992) notes that much of the existing empirical evidence goes against 
Schumpeter’s theory that larger firms with market power are generators of innovative 
growth,6 several empirical studies suggest that large firms obtain more patents and invest 
more in R&D than their smaller counterparts indirectly implying that they innovate more 
(Scherer, 1992, 1983).  This result could be attributed in part to the fact that formal statistics 
have not been able to capture informal or part time innovative activity – largely prevalent in 
SME (Kleinknecht, 1987).  
 
Alternate literature suggests that smaller firms innovate disproportionately to their size 
(Blundell et al., 1999). Zoltan and Acs (1990) found that SME produce more innovations per 
thousand employees and on average produce more innovations per million dollars worth of 
R&D spending. Himmelberg and Peterson (1990) tested 179 US small high tech companies to 
see whether limited assets reduce R&D expenditure. They found that R&D expenditure rose 
significantly with higher ratios of internal cash flow to initial asset values.  
 
 
6 Reasons cited for this range from organizational inertia to insulation from competition which discourages 
innovation (Porter, 1990).  Positive aspects related to large firm size include economies of scale in staffing and 




Thus, the empirical literature does not provide a clear answer on what type of market structure 
is most suited to innovative activity (Nicholas, 2003). These results may also be inconclusive 
because current data is being used to substantiate hypotheses created for a different time 
period. Despite conclusive evidence pointing either to Schumpeter 1911 or 1942, it seems safe 
to suggest that keeping market entry open for new entrants positively impacts innovation 
(Scherer, 1992).  
 
Schumpeter’s two contributions and the subsequent literature has brought forth the question 
as to what type of market structure is most suited to technological progress enabled growth 
(Scherer, 1992). As previously noted, while the there has been extensive examination of 
Schumpeter’s 1942 contribution, research on his 1911 contribution remains comparatively 
less. Though we will draw on aspects from Schumpeter 1942, this work is largely confined to 
enhancing the findings of Schumpeter 1911 in the context of SME in the software market.  
 
1.2 Focus of study 
The goal of this study is to obtain a better understanding of the role that SME play in 
innovation based competition in the software market. We postulate that software is a unique 
good and one that is different to other products in the high tech industry. In the following, we 
briefly examine the main issues related to software as a product and consider certain basic 
conditions in order to better understand innovation based competition, namely, the public 
good aspect of knowledge, the free rider problem, appropriability and intellectual property 
rights. This provides a basis for the chapters that follow where these aspects and the 
associated literature will be examined in greater depth. 
 
1.3 Software 
The software industry is an example of a knowledge based human capital intensive industry 
(Graham and Mowery, 2003) that has shown tremendous innovative activity primarily 
resulting from performance increases in hardware and the Internet. As a product that is sold, 
software is the R&D itself (Hall, 1999). In other words it is both the information and the 
technology simultaneously. It possesses all the features of a durable good yet it does not 
depreciate over time. Hence, existing software can only be replaced by new innovative 
developments. The industry is subject to rapid and continuous technological change where 




                                                
an incessant supply of innovative ideas (Scotchmer, 1991). Innovative development (i.e. 
R&D) costs are very high whereas duplication and distribution costs are low. Software also 
enables modular improvements where modules can be improved upon without affecting the 
structure of the whole program (Narduzzo and Rossi, 2005).7 This feature allows sequential 
and cumulative innovation. Further software exhibits both direct and indirect network effects. 
While some of these characteristics can also be observed in other high tech products, the 
collective whole seems to be unique to software. 
 
1.4 Public good aspect 
Software or source code can be likened to knowledge. Knowledge in itself is a public good 
and hence software has all the characteristics of public goods - namely non-excludability and 
non-rival consumption. These two features suggest that all consumers are able to avail of a 
public good and the consumption by one does not diminish the consumption of others nor 
does it exclude others from the good. Such goods give rise to two main problems: the free 
rider problem and the appropriability problem. The former refers to the situation where some 
consumers benefit from the good without paying for it. Under such circumstances, private 
provision of a public good will be below the optimum level, assuming there is any provision 
at all. This is because firms foresee the inability to appropriate profits from the provision of 
public goods i.e. the appropriability problem. Both these problems imply that there is a 
market failure in terms of desired public good provision.  
 
Software R&D is considered a risky investment that is only profitable when the expected 
profits exceed the initial development costs. Further, static efficiency requires that price be 
equal to marginal (opportunity) cost of production, which implies that in the case of 
intangible goods like software, the price would be equal to zero (Regibeau and Rockett, 
2004). In other words, once an idea is made public it can be reused infinitely. As a result the 
private benefits may quickly dwindle to marginal cost.8 Thus, private agents are unwilling to 
invest in software development in the presence of free riders and the absence of means to 
appropriate profits (Nelson and Romer, 1996). Another related area refers to knowledge 
spillovers where third parties benefit from private party developments further reducing the 
 
7 For further information on the differences between modular and integrated architectures, see Ulrich (1995). 
8 However, Scherer (1980) suggests that natural market imperfections may result in first mover advantages 




incentives to provide the public good. For example, Xerox invented the mouse and the 
graphical user interface however it was Apple and Microsoft that capitalized on these 
technological advances (Jarboe and Atkinson, 1998). Therefore, in order to induce private 
parties to provide the good, incentives must be administered, bringing us to the sticky issue of 
property rights for such goods.  
 
1.5 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Traditional intellectual property (IP) theory provides economic justification for tangible 
property (Lemley, 2007). In the case of knowledge, the non-rivalrous and non-excludable 
aspects ensure that everyone can use the knowledge without its value diminishing. This is in 
direct contrast to tangible goods implying that traditional IP theory does not provide a perfect 
fit for knowledge (Lemley, 2007). However knowledge creation requires incentives otherwise 
private agents will not invest in its creation. Once disclosed, knowledge is very difficult to 
control due to its public good characteristics (Arrow, 1962). Thus, leading Lemley (2007) to 
suggest that the economic justification for the use of IPR is to make certain that there are 
enough incentives to ensure that private actors will innovate. Hence the actors are not being 
rewarded for their labour instead they are being given incentives to provide a public good. 
 
IPR both encourages and inhibits the provision of public goods where institutions like 
copyright and patents have an impact on how knowledge is created and distributed (Cortright, 
2001). IPR grant short term monopoly profits so as to provide incentives to innovate. From a 
theoretical point of view, intellectual property rights are designed to create incentives for the 
innovator (ex ante incentive) and to ensure that information is disclosed within the public 
domain (ex post efficiency) to stimulate future innovation and competition. In a sense they 
seek to solve both the appropriability and free rider problem and reward innovators for the 
provision of a public good. However, monopoly profits result in welfare losses creating 
dynamic market failure. This trade-off between ex-ante incentive and ex-post efficiency forms 
the crux of the IPR debate.  
 
The main argument for intellectual property protection within the software market comes 
from the fact that imitation costs are very low and thus appropriation would be difficult from 
pure information innovations if not for IPR. However intellectual property rights for basic 




                                                
2001). Further, when considering the cost structure for knowledge production, firms who use 
“protection” have the ability to garner large profits. The following section and the coming 
chapters will highlight that the use of IPR in the software market, with particular reference to 
SME, has varying implications due to the uniqueness of software as a product. In this work, 
we focus only on the use of copyrights and patents in the software industry.  Specifically, we 
examine how the use of IPR affects SME (firm) strategies, competition, innovation, and 
knowledge sharing enabled through spillover activity.  
 
1.6 In case of software: IPR results in OSS and proprietary software 
The software market is unique in that the use of IPR has led to the development of two forms 
of software provision: open source and proprietary software. The primary difference between 
the two lies in the accessibility of the underlying source code.9 Proprietary software 
developers rely on IPR to ensure that their knowledge is protected whereby any 
uncompensated spillover loss would result in a reduction of profits. Thus proprietary software 
provision leads to excludability enabling firms to appropriate their investment through license 
and duplication fees. 
 
Open source software (OSS) can be considered as an endogenous open solution which 
voluntarily supplies the public good. This phenomenon has been referred to as the private 
provision of a public good (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, Johnson, 2001) where 
numerous experienced private agents using their own resources contribute to the public good 
(Lakhani and Wolf, 2001). In this case knowledge is shared freely and the actual software is 
available for free thereby fulfilling the non-excludability requirement and promoting 
knowledge spillovers and future innovation. Users are able to run, study and modify existing 
programs without having to pay the initial creators royalties (Renner et al., 2005, Wheeler, 
2005). In fact a large majority of the users are free riders. Hence OSS enables a novel 
alternative to traditional innovation patterns (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) and traditional 
use of IPR while also facilitating sequential and cumulative innovation.  
 
 
9 The former refers to software where the source code is accessible while the latter refers to when it is not. 
Access to open source software source code depends on the license under which the product operates. Broadly 
the licenses can be divided in to the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) license where there are no restrictions 
on redistribution except that credit be given to the original authors and the General Public License (GPL) where 




The software market thus exhibits a co-existence of two types of technology sharing strategies 
(Jansen, 2006) for the same public good where one shares the information of the good freely 
and the other does not (Lessig, 2002). Market agents are able to decide whether they prefer to 
be open or closed.  However the trade-off from pursuing a particular strategy is still unclear as 
the incentives for each system vary. In the case of proprietary software the pecuniary benefits 
are greater and seem to be the main motivator, whereas in the case of OSS, signalling and 
fame seem to be greater motivators in ensuring the provision of the public good (Lerner & 
Tirole, 2002). As a result, OSS has been considered as a no-cost competitor to proprietary 
suppliers of software (Bitzer, 2004, Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawhat, 2003) thereby 
altering the nature of competition.  
 
Both forms of technology sharing strategies suffer from certain drawbacks. OSS through its 
lack of direction and focus on user/developer needs indicates distortions in provision and 
investment structures (Bitzer and Schroeder, 2006). In the case of proprietary software, 
Carlton and Gertner (2002) suggest that the use of IPR can push technology based markets 
towards market concentration and significant market power, through extensive network 
effects and economies of scale in R&D. This market power often results in the market being 
dominated by a single technology often belonging to a single firm. These actions could curtail 
or impede subsequent efforts by competitors, particularly SME, in dynamic markets.  
 
1.7 IPR versus competition policy  
IPR limit the distribution of knowledge based goods by temporarily preventing competition. 
This allows private agents to sell knowledge above the marginal cost of reproducing it. Hence 
less people would buy it than if the good was available under more competitive conditions 
and would pay more for it. The production of public goods’ argument can only be used as 
long as IP laws on balance offset the costs of producing such goods (Gallini and Anderson, 
1998, Landes and Posner, 1987). This balance is sought to be achieved through the scope and 
duration of IPR mechanisms (Lemley, 2007) after which inventions are to be freely available 
in the public domain. 
 
Landes and Posner (1987) examined whether the excludability that IPR enable, creates value. 
Hence they implied that IPR are only justifiable to the extent that they create value. By 




                                                
society, and firms are able to charge a price higher than marginal cost. This restriction on new 
knowledge limits the dynamic innovation process (Webbink, 2005). New innovations develop 
on existing ideas and technology. Excessive control of positive externalities associated with 
new innovation also determines the further development and uses of subsequent innovations 
(Webbink, 2005). Since IPR afford market power, rent seeking through the same has resulted 
in overinvestment in R&D and duplication efforts.  
 
Schumpeter type innovation often imposes a deadweight loss on society through the reduction 
of output and increased prices. The balance between what society gains from Schumpeterian 
type innovation and high costs in terms of prices, switching costs and limited supply is a 
highly contended issue particularly in the anti-trust literature (Gilbert and Katz, 2001). It has 
also been suggested that monopolists tend to invest less in innovation than their competitive 
counterparts (Lemley, 2007, Arrow, 1962).10 Thus the main aim of modern antitrust law is to 
use competition such that it facilitates economic efficiency (Lemley, 2007). 
 
Economic efficiency according to Lemley (2007) is to achieve a balance between the social 
benefit of providing incentives to innovate and the costs of limiting knowledge diffusion. 
Anti-trust laws aim to ensure competition and hence provide a set of checks for activities that 
threaten competition i.e., anti competitive behaviour (Samuelson, 1987). IP law tends to 
create framework conditions that could lead to monopolies. Very strong IP laws tend to 
negatively impact competition and reduce welfare. In such cases antitrust law constrains what 
companies can do with their IPR. Too strong competition laws also have negative 
consequences as they promote static efficiency at the cost of long term efficiency. While there 
appears to be a conflict between intellectual property law and competition policy/antitrust 
 
10 Joseph Schumpeter suggested that monopolies favour innovation while Arrow suggested that it was 
competition that favours innovation. Schumpeter based his arguments on the idea that large firms tend to have 
more capital for R&D in-house overcoming agency problems and information asymmetries that other firms in 
the market might face (Baker, 2007). By virtue of being the market leader with an installed base and reputation 
allows monopolists a head start. The first firm to develop and market an innovation captures the largest rent. 
Arrow suggested that monopolists have less incentives to innovate as the value of marginal benefit of subsequent 
innovation is not as high as it would be for a newcomer who would – if he succeeds – gain much market share 
and therefore has very high incentives to innovate. The process of a competitive firm taking over an existing 
market is referred to as the Arrow effect of replacement effect. The replacement effect is the strongest when the 






                                                
laws in the context of knowledge, the main goal of both is to achieve a balance between 
competition and monopoly in the context of dynamic efficiency.11  
 
Scherer (1992) suggests that industries like software that exhibit high levels of technological 
innovation tend to have fewer sellers resulting from barriers to entry facilitated by IPR. Thus 
there appears to be a trade-off between facilitating static efficiency through competition and 
dynamic efficiency through optimal investments in R&D in high tech markets. As it is evident 
that such goods are beneficial to society, enabling temporary market power in high tech 
markets seems justified.  
 
However, Carlton and Gertner (2002) explain that there is a fundamental tension between 
anti-trust law and IP law in such markets where IP law creates market power and antitrust law 
restricts its use. They suggest that the former provides a static framework to analyze a 
dynamic setting which leads to errors. High tech markets exhibit creative destruction where 
one company is the market leader today only to be displaced by another firm tomorrow. 
Antitrust law was not designed based on this type of competition (Carlton & Gertner 2002). 
However the authors suggest that antitrust law should focus on preserving innovation based 
competition since firms with static market power tend to distort the dynamic innovation 
process.  
 
It should be noted that not all firms with IPR abuse their power and hence decisions taken in 
the interest of a firm itself are not always bad and not the target of antitrust law. Instead 
Carlton and Gertner (2002) suggest that IP laws should be used to promote more open 
standards and systems to create a competitive environment.  
 
1.8 Main question 
In summary: The above discussion briefly examined framework conditions that impact 
competition in the software market. These along with the unique features of software, further 
examined in the next chapter, lead us to postulate that competition within this market is 
 
11 Lemley (2007) in fact suggests that seen from the dynamic context, IP law and competition policy share the 
common goal of achieving maximum wealth by producing what consumers want at minimum cost. Hence IP 
laws provide incentives to innovate and new innovations imply increased competition through creative 





unique. The work that follows consists of three essays which examine the following question: 
In the context of IPR, what impact do SME have on competition in the software industry?  
 
1.9 Outline & Contributions  
In the following essays, we begin from the starting point that SME are a given in the software 
market and further contend that they are beneficial to dynamic efficiency. These essays focus 
on three reoccurring themes, namely: proprietary and open source software, intellectual 
property rights and knowledge sharing (spillovers). The choice of open source or closed 
source software depends largely on the extent to which firms are willing to engage in 
knowledge sharing and the importance of learning and spillovers. IPR thus could be viewed 
as a strategic tool to either increase or decrease knowledge sharing and competition.  
 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 of this work seeks to expand upon the issues 
raised in the introduction and considers the associated literature in greater depth. Specifically 
this chapter examines the unique features of software as a product to better understand the 
unique pattern of innovation based competition in the software market. It further examines 
how the instruments of IPR are used in the software market and how IPR impacts upon the 
strategies of existing and potential agents i.e., SME. The chapter also highlights how the use 
of IPR affects the closed versus open systems within the market. Chapter 2 closes with three 
broad summary aspects related to the software industry and the building blocks needed for the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the issue of co-existence i.e. open source and closed source software 
within the software industry and how this promotes competition. While it is evident that co-
existence is relevant to the software market, few attempts have been made to understand the 
reason behind this co-existence. In this theoretical chapter we focus specifically on explaining 
what we believe is one of the primary reasons for co-existence. The chapter builds on three 
concepts, namely: bundling by the incumbent, the sequential and cumulative nature of 
software innovation and spillover activity.  
 
Bundling is often considered anti-competitive and the negative effects of the same have been 
considered in numerous articles (Whinston, 1990, Carlton and Waldmann, 2001, Choi and 




factors, bundling could have varying implications for the software industry. Thus providing 
an instance where the direct applicability of traditional anti-trust doctrines may not work. The 
sequential and cumulative nature of software refers to the systematic development of new 
software based on existing developments in contrast to isolated innovations. The last aspect 
comes from the observation that there exists spillover activity between the proprietary and 
open source segments. This chapter attempts to incorporate the unique features of software in 
explaining one facet of competition within the software market. 
 
In light of the creative destruction concept, an inherent part of competition within the software 
market, it is evident that current technology leaders constantly need new innovations so as to 
effectively compete and maintain their market power. We postulate that these innovative 
inputs are provided to the incumbent through spillover activity from the open source segment. 
In other words, proprietary incumbents are willing to tolerate increased competition from the 
open source community, in order to be able to obtain and benefit from knowledge spillovers. 
Thus we suggest that the co-existence enabled by spillover activity ensures dynamic 
competition. 
 
We explain our postulation with the help of a Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1929). Our model 
has 3 firms, a proprietary firm and two competing open source firms taken to represent a 
simplified form of proprietary and open source firms in the software market. The proprietary 
firm provides two products while the competing firms provide one product each such that 
each product has a direct competitor. The proprietary firm is faced with the possibility of 
spillovers from the open source firms where spillovers are captured in the cost function. We 
consider three varying asymmetric spillover frameworks under bundling and no bundling. 
Only asymmetric spillovers are considered as we assume that due to IPR the open source 
firms obtain no spillovers from the proprietary firm. By bundling, the proprietary firm 
encourages the competing firms to increase R&D spending. This increased spending is carried 
over to the integrated firm in the form of reduced R&D costs. As a result, past a specific 
threshold of spillovers, it makes more sense for the proprietary firm to bundle as profits from 
bundling are higher than from not bundling. When considering spillovers and welfare, we 
find welfare to be higher when Firm 1 bundles. We further find that the proprietary firm will 
only bundle when there is more than one competing open source firm highlighting the 
importance of many innovative ideas and firms to sustain innovation based competition. Our 




importance of spillover activity for the same. Thus, it might be said that co-existence further 
reduces overall R&D expenditure and duplication but at the same time ensures diversity. 
 
In summary: Chapter 3 makes a normative contribution to the dynamic policy literature. The 
main aspect studied in this chapter refers to spillovers and the extent to which they can be 
appropriated. In particular we examine spillover exchange between SME and large software 
firms in the context of bundling. Bundling and the resulting competition policy measures are 
well understood under static conditions. Based on the findings of our static model, we 
extrapolate that bundling and spillovers in a dynamic setting could render the standard 
argument against bundling not entirely true. Thus we suggest that competition policy in the 
software market should consider bundling under dynamic competition because it could lead to 
a different conclusion resulting from the factors unique to the software market e.g., OSS 
programmers. 
 
In chapter 4 we examine whether increased IPR adoption by small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME) enables greater competition within the information and communications 
(ICT) sector which includes the software industry. The discussion thus far briefly highlighted 
the possible negative distortions that IPR can have on competition, investment and innovation 
structures. These distortions have resulted in impeding market entry for small and medium 
sized firms in to the software market. Schumpeter (1942) believed that large firms had a 
critical advantage with respect to innovation and that small firms lack the assets to be able to 
innovate. However, Williamson suggests that the adoption of IPR can enable SME to sell 
their knowledge and enter markets dominated by larger players and thereby increase 
competition. While there is an extensive breadth of literature focusing on the use of IPR by 
large firms, the question with regard to small firms still remains unclear and inadequately 
researched.  
 
Our aim in chapter 4 is to provide further insights on small and medium sized firms and their 
adoption of IPR. The analysis is based on a dataset of SME in the information and 
communications sector which also includes the software industry. We make use of the 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) in order to study the impact of varying one factor and its 
subsequent effect on the other variables in the model. Four factors were studied to observe 
their impact on SME adoption of IPR: globalization, legal frameworks, cooperative research 




Our analysis brought forth four interesting findings. The first finding indicates there is a 
significant relationship between globalization and the level of patenting. Globalization refers 
to market reach i.e. regional, country and international markets. In other words, the more an 
SME competes in varying markets the higher is the tendency to adopt IPR. There appears to 
be little (if any) literature that suggests that this correlation has been examined before. Most 
studies have used firm innovation or R&D as the major determinant of IPR adoption. Second 
we find that co-operative research plays an important role in globalization and IPR adoption. 
Thus the more SME collaborate and compete, the greater is the emphasis on IPR adoption. 
Third, we find that there is a significant and positive relationship between legal frameworks 
that aid in innovation and the adoption of IPR. Thus, SME will adopt IPR when it enables 
them to sell and develop their intellectual property. This in turn allows market entry thereby 
increasing competition. Fourth, we find that the use of OSS reduces the tendency to adopt 
IPR which in turn creates competition between the open and closed systems operating in the 
market.  
 
In summary: This empirical essay makes a positive contribution to the IPR policy literature. 
The main aspect studied here is how SME are able to appropriate their innovations. Through 
the use of IPR, firms are partially able to solve the problem of appropriability arising from 
public goods/knowledge. Consequently this paper examines the reality of SME and IPR use.  
 




                                                
Chapter 2 
 
2. Software as a product and IPR 
2.1 Software 
In the introductory chapter we focused on two main aspects namely dynamic efficiency and 
Schumpeter’s 1911 supposition that SME drive innovation. Small firms tend to be technology 
leaders in markets that are highly innovative and have a high proportion of large firms (Acs 
and Audretsch 1987). Further SME seem to have a greater competitive advantage in markets 
that more closely resemble the competitive market model (Acs and Audretsch 1987).12 They 
can be quick to market, flexible and hence are able to exploit certain market niches. However, 
it has been suggested that due to the limited use of IPR by SME, their innovative capacity is 
not fully exploited (Iversen, 2004). Research shows that SME tend to make more use of 
informal methods of protection e.g. lead-time advantages instead of formal ones as they prefer 
to invest their resources in developing new innovations (Kitching and Blackburn, 1998).  
 
In the context of IPR, we postulate that SME have an important role to play in facilitating 
dynamic efficiency in the software market. In order to further explain our postulation this 
chapter seeks to provide an understanding for software as a product and the implications for its 
development. In addition the chapter examines how the use of IPR affects firm strategies 
within this industry i.e., proprietary and OSS models. We build upon the introductory chapter 
and while not exhaustive, the issues explored in this chapter provide a prelude to the chapters 
that follow. We begin with basic definitions and desirable properties of software.  
 
2.1.1 Definitions and desirable properties of software 
Software consists of programs that run on a computer, e.g. Microsoft Excel.13 These programs 
are written as text documents called the source-code i.e., the underlying knowledge of a 
software program. The source-code contains readable instructions that control the program’s 
operation. Note that software must be compiled before it can be used by a computer. This 
 
12 Their empirical study uses a slightly modified Schumpeterian hypothesis where they assume that the innovative 
advantage of a firm, large or small, is determined by the extent of imperfect competition prevalent in the market 
under study.  
 





                                                
compiled material is called the binary code which consists of zeros and ones. The computer 
application can be used once its binary code has been created, and is difficult to modify or 
improve unless programmers have access to the source code.14 Since many consumers are 
interested only in using the program, it is possible to sell software without access to the 
underlying knowledge.  
 
In the following we briefly enumerate the desired qualities of software (Fielding, 2000). It is 
important to understand this set of desirable features since different ownership structures 
might encourage a different subset of these attributes.  
- Reliability: is measured as the length of time a system can stay in operation before it 
requires intervention (Nielson, 2000). Reliability also refers to high quality which is 
typically measured by the number of errors in a fixed number of lines of code. 
- Secure: Software is secure when it is not vulnerable to intervention by unauthorized users 
(Howard, 1997, Pfleeger, 1997). 
- Flexibility: is measured by how easily software can be customized to meet specific needs 
of the user and run on different types of devices (Messerschmitt and Szyperski, 2001). 
- Interoperability and open standards: The definition of interfaces between individual 
components and the definitions or settings of standards are of great importance for 
interoperability. With compatible interfaces and open standards, various applications with 
different functionalities can be bundled and offered (Varian et al., 2004). 
- The attractiveness of software is greatly enhanced by low switching costs, i.e., the cost of 
moving from one system to another should be low.  
- Finally the total cost of ownership15 should be low. In other words the costs i.e., 
development, use and maintenance, incurred over the lifetime of the software product 
should be low.  
 
14  The source code is written in one of several “high level” languages like C, C++, Java and Visual Basic. 
Computer games are typically written in C, C++ while server related software is usually written in Java. 
Windows is written in C and C++ while Linux is written mostly in C. These high level languages have compliers 
that translate the instructions into binary code that can be understood by the computer hardware. Thus the value 
of the program resides in its source code written in these high level languages.  
15 The total cost of ownership (TCO) has been defined by the Gartner Corporation (1987) as “all costs, direct and 
indirect, incurred throughout the life cycle of an IT asset including acquisition and procurement, operations and 
maintenance and end of life management. Often the procurement cost is a very small part of the TCO for 
example in OSS – however this can be misleading as the other costs related to OSS are not immediately visible 




                                                
2.1.2 Unique features of software 
Our next task is to define the characteristics that make software different from other goods. 
- Software and hardware are complementary goods that only have value and utility when 
consumed together. 
- Software has the features of a durable good, but unlike a durable good it does not 
depreciate over time and hence the consumer’s utility from using it does not decrease 
over time. Thus existing software can only be replaced by innovation. 
- Software is subject to rapid technological change which is often facilitated through 
cumulative and sequential innovative development. This development is subject to 
economies of scale. 
- The use of software is subject to direct network effects (application software) and indirect 
effects (operating systems and platforms) which play an important role in the adoption of 
software products.16  
- Another distinguishing feature of software is the nature of production costs. Typically 
there is a very high fixed cost which is the development cost or the R&D cost. 
Distributing the software itself is virtually costless since it is inexpensive to duplicate the 
software and make it available to end-users. This creates a situation where the marginal 
cost of production declines rapidly and hence lies below the average cost of production. 
Firms that use marginal cost pricing therefore will make losses. Average cost pricing is 
necessary to recoup development costs. Thus software shares features of a natural 
monopoly. The nature of production costs also has implications for the demand side of 
the market making the choice of a pricing strategy difficult for the monopolist. After 
selling to consumers who value the product highly, the monopolist would like to reduce 
prices to sell to consumers with low valuation. Anticipating this behaviour, consumers 
will wait till prices drop. From the Coase conjecture it then follows that the monopolist 
 
16 A good or service is said to have a network effect if its value to a potential buyer depends on the number of 
existing users of the good or service (demand side externality). Typically network effects become significant after 
a critical mass of users are present, which is often referred to as the “tipping point.” Further the large user base 
allows better communication and sharing which facilitates the production of complementary products (supply 




                                                
will be forced to lower her prices and sell at marginal cost almost immediately (Coase, 
1972, Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson, 1986).17 
- Finally software can be developed in modules which allow improvements in certain 
modules/parts of a program or operating system without affecting other parts of the whole 
structure.  
While some of these characteristics are also exhibited by other high tech products, the 
interplay of the features discussed above have a unique impact on the innovation and 
competition process in the software industry. We next explain two features, specific to 
software innovation, which further impact the innovation and competition process. 
 
2.1.3 Two features specific to software innovation 
Reverse engineering: is the process of extracting know-how or knowledge from a man-made 
artifact in order to develop a competing stand alone product (Vives, 2002). While reverse 
engineering is allowed legally for interoperability reasons, Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002) 
advocate reverse engineering in general. They suggest that reverse engineering contributes to 
an increase in overall innovation when comparing it to the harmful effects it creates. Within 
the software industry reverse engineering occurs at the applications level and usually not on 
the platform level. It converts closed interfaces in to open ones and as a result increases rival 
firms R&D and decreases that of incumbent firms. Consequently, Vives (2002) suggests that 
prices of incumbents will be higher in the short run and lower in the long run due to increased 
competition. While in theory this may be the case it is important to note that reverse 
engineering in software without access to the source code is quite difficult (Weber, 2004).18  
 
Cumulative and sequential nature: Another feature that influences innovation in software is 
the cumulative nature of knowledge acquisition and the complementarities provided by the 
same (Friedewald et al., 2002). Often innovation in the software industry is characterized as 
 
17  It can be argued that this problem is mitigated by the entry of new consumers into the market who place a high 
value on the product. Another way out is to create new versions of the product, though here again the monopolist 
has to compete with older vintages of her own product. 
18 When considering this, the probability of stealing ideas or imitating seems to be quite low. In fact, such a 






                                                
new expressions of existing knowledge.19 Bessen and Maskin (2000) propose, in a dynamic 
setting, that innovation in software markets is both sequential and complementary and that 
imitation actually spurs innovation. Their idea can be explained as follows: Sequentiality 
refers to the idea that each successive innovation builds upon the previous innovation. 
Complementarity refers to the fact that each innovator will pursue different research paths and 
thereby increasing the overall chances of reaching an innovation goal sooner.20 This implies 
that a greater number of competing firms will create a greater number of innovations.  
 
Theoretically the impact of sequential innovation has been studied, among others, by 
Scotchmer (1996), Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Chang (1995). Scotchmer (1991) 
suggests that often the most important function an innovation has, is to provide impetus to 
innovations that follow it. Thus, incentive mechanisms need to exist for both early and 
subsequent innovators especially in cases where first mover profits can be greatly reduced 
through reverse engineering and imitation. However, these authors acknowledge that those 
who contribute to the cumulative innovation process are many in number, often geographically 
dispersed and hard to identify making rewarding them a difficult task. Further they highlight 
the difficulties of rewarding a pure information innovator.  
 
Often commercial value only occurs in later versions of a product where innovators have 
learned from their predecessors. Pure information is important to society and while costs 
might be higher for the first innovator, society will benefit more from the second innovator’s 
commercial application. As a result it could present a problem for initial innovators to gain 
commercial benefits from their innovations. Anton and Yao (1998) show that it is difficult for 
initial innovators to provide only parts of their innovation if they wish to reap some benefit 
from their innovation. The authors suggest that in the absence of complete disclosure of the 
source code, initial innovators will find it hard to make their product acceptable. 
Consequently, strong property rights for the first innovator reduce the incentives for 
subsequent innovators (Hall 1999).  
 
 
19 In fact the Oracle Corporation states that “Whether a software program is a good one does not generally depend 
on the newness of a specific technique, but instead depends on the unique combination of known algorithms and 
methods.” 




                                                
In summary In the case of software, what is being sold is the R&D itself which distinguishes it 
from other physical products (Hall, 1999)21. Hence firms that are innovative will be imitated 
by others or maybe unable to commercialize their products and thus would not innovate 
further due to the inability to appropriate gains. This aspect is more pronounced when 
considering the high initial development costs and minimal if not zero duplication and 
distribution costs of software. This implies that if left to the free market forces, the incentives 
to innovate would decrease entirely. The discussion thus far provides justification for the use 
of IPR for software which the next section seeks to address.  
 
2.2 IPR and software 
As seen in the introduction, Schumpeter advocated monopolies and monopolistic practices as 
necessary means to ensure appropriate innovation and incentive structures needed for future 
research. He claimed that increased rewards to society in terms of new technological 
improvements would level the welfare loss created by IPR. His intuition for this laid in 
dynamic efficiency where monopoly power is constantly challenged by competition from 
entrants who change the existing equilibrium state through new technology, giving way to new 
market leaders.  
 
However, unlike property rights for physical goods, IPR for software and other information 
goods are not fully transferred but only licensed (Gehring, 2006). Thus the costs for 
subsequent innovations depend on how easily innovators are able to use, license and build 
upon existing knowledge i.e., spillover activity (Besen and Raskind, 1991). The more 
extensive IPR protection, the greater are the costs for subsequent innovators i.e. SME, limiting 
market competition. We now turn to explaining the main forms of IPR used in the software 
industry and how they affect competition.22 
 
2.2.1 Copyright 
Traditionally, software was primarily protected by copyright. This form of intellectual 
property law protects the expression of an idea but not the idea itself. Copyrights are long 
 
21  We consider pure information to be synonymous with the source code where both have no stand alone value. 
22 While we acknowledge the importance of trade secrets in the software industry, particularly when considering 
that is the only viable option when it comes to architecture protection issues, we focus only on copyrights and 




                                                
lived and normally extend for 70 years after the life of the creator. According to the copyright 
statute for software, only the actual creator of the code is allowed to run, copy, modify or 
distribute the program unless stated otherwise by the copyright owner.23 Copyright protection 
for software is automatically obtained and rights of use are normally transferred through 
license agreements.  
 
In Europe, copyrights are not formally applied for nor are they registered. Under European 
software copyright law, the source code and the binary code are covered by the definition of a 
“computer program”. The law states that the owner of the source code, i.e., the programmer, 
will be the automatic owner of object or binary code unless there is more than one 
programmer where there is a possibility of co-ownership. This ownership criteria changes 
when the software was developed as part of work requirements. In such cases, the software 
code belongs to the employer unless contractually stipulated otherwise.  
 
Copyright protection does not protect against independent original creation which enables 
knowledge spillovers and hence allows horizontal market entry for those innovators who 
manufacture similar or complementary products. Despite being traditionally protected by 
copyright, some authors (Cohen and Lemley, 2001 Samuelson et al. 1994 and Menell 1987) 
suggest that copyright is not suitable for software as it does not protect the useful behaviour of 
software i.e., its source of value. 
 
2.2.2 Patents 
Next we turn to the second most common form of software protection; patents. Similar to 
copyrights, patents do not protect the underlying idea of an innovation but protect the technical 
application of a particular idea. Patents are exclusive rights awarded to innovations for 
originality, novelty and non-obviousness in exchange for disclosure of the innovation to 
society through publication of the patent application (Jaffe et al., 1998). The patent is the most 
powerful intellectual property rights mechanism and also the most expensive form of 
 
23 Direct copying is not allowed according to the law and this applies to the use of parts of the source code. 
Copying refers to both compilation i.e., converting source code to object code or decompilation i.e., converting 
object code in to source code. The latter is quite difficult but both require special licenses from the copyright 




protection. It enables the inventor to enjoy the commercial benefits arising from her 
innovation (Hall et al., 1999, Jaffe et al., 1998, Deakins, 1999).  
 
When granted, the patent is a public document which contains information about the 
innovation, the person who invented it, the assigned patent holder and the technological 
antecedents of the innovation (Masurel, 2005). Patent information can be an important source 
of information for subsequent competitors. This form of intellectual property law provides 
protection for a period of 20 years. The length of the patent has been questioned by Deakins 
(1999) who argues that the extremely short life cycles of technological products may not 
warrant such lengthy protection.  
 
As a result of the Diamond vs. Diehr case in 1981, patent protection was extended to software 
in the United States. It was decreed that algorithms qualified for patent protection as the 
distinction between abstract and physical was not clear (Merges, 1990a). Despite resistance 
from the United States Patent Office, in 1998, a decision by the US Federal Circuit stated that 
a mathematical algorithm i.e. source code, can not be excluded from patenting until and unless 
it does not provide a useful, concrete and tangible result. 
 
In Europe, the parliament vetoed patent protection for software in 2005 in order to protect 
Europe’s small and medium sized firms both using and creating software. Despite this veto, 
alternative practices have developed including computer implemented inventions (CII). There 
is no official definition of CII however evidence from court cases suggests that patents can be 
granted to software in the event that a process or piece of software requires hardware 
(International think tank for innovation and competition, 2005). Patents are thus granted for 
the hardware which enables a technical innovation.  
 
In the following we examine the third alternative mechanism available to software producers, 
OSS, as a means to govern software development. OSS presents an example where software 
development depends on the continuous disclosure of knowledge and the possibility to use and 





                                                
2.2.3 OSS24  
In recent years there has been an unprecedented growth in the development of open source 
software25, including investment by major corporations, making it important to understand 
what makes this possible.26 In other words why do so many programmers contribute to the 
provision of this public good despite extensive evidence of free-riders?  
 
A programmer receives an immediate, and a delayed payoff based on her actions. The current 
payoff consists of the benefit, monetary or otherwise, obtained from the task and the current 
costs stem from the disutility of effort. The delayed payoff can be in the form of reputation 
which consists of recognition among peers, sometimes called the ego gratification incentive. 
The delayed pecuniary payoff occurs in the form of future job offers, shares in commercial 
open source based companies, or future access to venture capital funds. Both types of delayed 
incentives are often jointly labeled as the signaling incentive (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). The 
signaling incentive is strong in the open source environment since it is possible to identify the 
creator of a particular program. As a result independent private programmers are willing to 
participate in the development of OSS. 
 
Additionally independent programmers are also motivated by the OSS ideology (Von Hippel, 
2005). The ideology of OSS rests upon the idea that own innovation should and can also be 
 
24  The history of software development is replete with cooperative efforts and can be divided in to three phases 
according to Lerner and Tirole (2002). The first period lasted from the early sixties to the early eighties where 
much of the activity took place in academic settings. Much of the effort was directed towards developing an 
operating system that could run on multiple platforms and there was virtually no attempt to restrict use or 
establish proprietary rights. However, in the early eighties, AT&T began enforcing its property rights over Unix 
related operations which marked the beginning of the second phase till the late nineties. The most important 
development in this period was the establishment of a licensing procedure for cooperatively developed software 
i.e., GPL. The third era began in the early nineties and is tied to the rapid growth of the Internet. A new 
contractual agreement called the “Debian Social Contract” became popular which provided greater flexibility in 
using the program. It allowed proprietary software to be bundled with cooperatively developed software. In this 
period we see the emergence of such bundled products or multiple variants of the same basic software. The 
objective of this approach was to foster R&D in areas the open source community was not keen to venture in to. 
The fact that open source software would be used as an intermediate input in this process has had a positive 
impact on the open source community and its future growth. For an extensive review of open source software, its 
development and business models see Weber (2004). 
25 Refer Kuan, 2001, Franke and von Hippel, 2003, Weber, 2004, Narduzzo and Rossi, 2005 
26 Companies like Google and IBM contributed software engineers and programmers to the open source software 




                                                
used by third parties as a building block for further innovation (Benkler, 2002, von Hippel 
(2005b). In other words the source code is made available for all who wish to use it. Notable 
examples of OSS include Linux, the operating system, Apache, a website server, and MySQL, 
a database environment. It is different from shareware and freeware where software can be 
downloaded free of charge but access to the source code is prohibited.  
 
The following describes the main features of open source software. 
- OSS can be easily customized and localized to suit individual needs as the source code is 
readily available and users are allowed to modify the software to their specific needs.  
- Within the open source software movement, users are encouraged to participate in the 
innovation process (von Hippel, 2005) which has the added positive side effect of speedy 
bug elimination (Raymond 2000).27 This implies that OSS provides more flexibility and 
security than proprietary software where users are dependent on vendors for 
improvements and updates due to the binary nature of the product.  
- OSS with its open interfaces implies lower switching costs compared to proprietary 
software where interfaces are usually protected by copyright and thus are closed. Thus it 
could be said that there is competition in both the product and input markets for OSS. 
- Open source software enables these features by using existing intellectual property rights 
i.e., copyright laws to ensure the freedoms of use, modification, and redistribution 
associated with open source software known as “copyleft”.28 Upon redistribution users 
are subject to some restrictions depending on the license under which the software 
operates.  
 
OSS licenses can be divided into the the BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) and GPL 
(General Public License) which characterize the two main types of licensing agreements: weak 
 
27  It is important to note that only projects of interest to the community benefit from early and timely bug 
corrections. Thus the development of OSS is very much dependent on the needs of those who create and use it. 
Eliminating errors in proprietary software usually takes much longer and could be attributed to the integrated 
architectural structure where solving a single aspect could require revamping of the entire system. However, von 
Hippel (2005) suggests that though this argument is often provided by proprietary software vendors, if carefully 
examined, it is possible to separate the individual elements of the integrated architectures. 
28 The copyleft concept was originally created by MIT hacker Richard Stallman in the early 1980s (Weber, 2004). 
Stallman’s copyleft principle forms the basis for the GNU General Public License. Recently the principles of 




                                                
and strong.29 The former permits the user to use, modify, copy and withhold their own 
modifications to the source code and sell it as a proprietary product with the only stipulation 
that credit be given to the original authors.  
 
The latter refers to licenses like the GNU Public License (GNU GPL, EUGPL30 or GPL) – 
These licences allow the user to use, modify, copy and redistribute any variation of the source 
code under the same GPL license. Users may charge a fee for this service or provide it freely, 
but under no circumstance can they make the product proprietary. These licenses could 
represent an in-built mechanism that enables continued contributions to the common 
information pool. 
 
In summary Both the proprietary and OSS ideologies favour selling software for a positive 
price. Despite being a durable good, the price of software cannot be above the cost of copying 
due to its public good nature. Particularly in the case of OSS, by allowing third parties full 
access to source code, prices tend to zero. Firms can however sell complementary products 
and services around the software for a positive price e.g. RedHat, and IBM employ this 
business model. OSS licenses thus, depict a market endogenous commitment mechanism 
which requires complete disclosure and low license fees. These licenses, from a transaction 
cost perspective cheaply promote sequential innovation, particularly in the case of GPL 
through the re-use of third party ideas (Gehring, 2006). In the following section, we examine 
how the above discussed ideologies affect firm strategies within the software industry.  
 
2.3 Open versus closed systems: IPR and competition 
Software, similar to other industries with network effects, exhibits the presence of open and 
closed systems i.e., open source software and proprietary software. This section31 examines the 
literature on three possible firm strategies of protection namely: Copyright, patents and open 
source software and their effects on competition. We discuss the pros and cons of adopting 
 
29 The multitude of other open source licenses existing in the market fall in between these two extremes. A 
description of OSS licenses can be found in Bruegge et al. (2004) and www.opensource.org 
30 EUPL –European Union Public License, is a European drafted software license and similar to the GPL. 
However, it differs to the GPL in that the freedoms associated with the license can be revoked through a 
unilateral decision of the EU Commission.   




                                                
each strategy in order to be able to shed some light on the impact of such strategies on SME in 
the software industry. 
  
2.3.1 Copyright as a strategy  
As noted previously, copyright protection as a strategy represents the most easily attainable 
form of IPR for software (Menell, 1987). This form of intellectual property law does not 
require disclosure which implies that new solutions need not be made public nor does there 
need to be access to the source code. While this may seem to limit cumulative and sequential 
innovation through limited spillover activity, in reality the scope of copyright protection is low 
implying that barriers to entry are also low. As a result, the costs of circumventing copyright 
protection, through imitation and continued innovation, are low which in turn enables 
horizontal differentiation. In the context of sequential innovation, it could be said that 
copyright seems to be the more efficient option (Bessen and Maskin, 2000).32 Thus one could 
deduce that the incentives to innovate are high for subsequent innovators under copyright 
protection.  
 
Despite the above stated benefits of copyright protection, there are also some negative side 
effects. When considering that copyrights allow imitation this must also necessarily imply that 
the costs of reverse engineering are almost zero. Thus, while copyright protection enables 
subsequent innovators to also avail of profits, it lessens the overall incentive to innovate. In 
other words, profits for subsequent innovators take profits away from the existing technology 
leader.  
 
In recent times, copyrights have taken on much more significance in the software market 
(Varian et al., 2004). This effect is particularly visible in the case of software interfaces where 
due to the presence of strong network effects and asymmetric markets, the protection of 
interfaces has resulted in skewing competition and innovation processes.33 As a result, barriers 
to entry and incompatibilities increase for new innovators or existing firms including SME.   
 
32 However, Rossi (2004) suggests that the fact that software is both the information and technology at the same 
time limits the adequacy of copyright protection.  
33 Copyright protection has given Microsoft a great deal of control and market power over interfaces like desktop 
software and other software i.e., middleware and other software running on Windows (Varian et al., 2004). In the 




                                                                                                                                                        
In analyzing the impact of copyright in the current context of interfaces, Varian et al., (2004) 
suggest that by conferring excessive protection to one firm, society gives the entire 
responsibility to innovate to this one firm. They explain their supposition using a concave 
function indicating that the chances that this one firm would continuously come up with all 
new innovations is relatively low if not zero. However, they acknowledge that the goal is to 
ensure this firm continues to innovate. Hence, they suggest this dilemma can be analyzed from 
two perspectives: The first approach suggests that copyrights are important in order to ensure 
innovation and prevent piracy which is inefficient. Whereas the second approach suggests that 
due to the resultant concavity, more firms are needed in order to have constant innovation. In 
other words, current innovations depend on past innovations and thus, copyright protection 
should be less extensive thereby enabling dynamic efficiency.34  
 
In summary: Copyright affords the longest time period of protection for software. Despite 
some of its negative effects resulting from the presence of industry specific features, it allows 
for increased competition in the software market through horizontal market entry since the 
costs of working around copyright are low thereby enabling spillover activity.  
 
2.3.2 Patents as a strategy 
The benefits of software patents as a strategy are still highly debated and there is no clear 
consensus on the effects of patents on technology creation or competition. The theoretical 
literature focus is on determining the optimal length of patent protection (Nordhaus, 1969) i.e., 
the time awarded to the innovator where she has exclusive rights over her innovation and the 
breadth35 (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990, O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998) i.e., the 
extent of protection such that it increases the costs of imitation and improvements of 
subsequent and existing competitors (Regibeau and Rockett, 2004). The development of 
software implies that increased breadth would distort the innovation process while excessive 
length would correspond to increased welfare losses. However, the negative effects of greater 
lengths of protection i.e., welfare loss, can be compensated through continuous innovation 
limit any fines to be paid as a result of this action. It should be noted however that when trying to achieve 
compatibility, it is legally possible to copy and reverse engineer software in both the US and the EU. 
34  The flexibility of copyright protection can be seen in the differing ideologies of Microsoft and Linux. 
35 The breadth of patent protection has been further divided in to lagging breadth and leading breadth. The former 
refers to protection against imitation while the latter refers to protection against improvements (Regibeau and 




                                                
which is made possible when patent breadth is limited (Arundel, 2000). Reducing patent 
breadth would in turn reduce the ability of patent holders to block subsequent competitors 
from using and continuing to develop technologies. 
 
When considering patents using a static model, the results show that in fact, patents do not 
provide sufficient incentives for innovators (Varian et al., 2004). The intuition is explained as 
follows: When compared to the consumer surplus resulting during the lifetime of the patent 
plus the increase in consumer surplus due to a price reduction upon expiry of the patent, what 
the innovator can appropriate is much less. The static model assumes that the innovation 
would not have been developed had it not been for this one innovator which implies less than 
suitable R&D investments. If this same problem is considered in a dynamic setting, due to 
increased R&D efforts from other firms, the social cost of the patent and the deadweight loss 
associated to it suggest that the rewards to the patent holder may be higher.36   
 
Empirically it has been shown that there has been a considerable increase in the number of 
business and software patents issued however often without proper adherence to patentability 
requirements (Scotchmer and Gallini, 2001). Bessen and Maskin (2000) studied a sample of 
software patents in the US where they found that firms that patent did not increase their R&D 
spending in comparison to those who had a lower propensity to patent. Further they found, 
subsequently confirmed by Lerner and Zhu (2005), that when patenting becomes easier and 
less costly, firms tend to patent more. Varian et al., (2004) and Mann (2005) contend that in 
the software industry, compared to other industries, the barriers to entry are lower and 
therefore, the use of IPR is more intense thereby distorting competition. The studies above, 
point to the fact that often companies patent for strategic reasons which includes the 
preservation of market positions and hinders competition often through litigation.37 
 
An example of how companies restrict competition refers to patent thickets where one product 
is tied to several patents (Bessen, 2002, Gallini, 2002). For example, software patents may not 
 
36 For more on this, refer to Varian et al., (2004) The Economics of Information Technology, Cambridge 
University Press. 
37 For an understanding of the importance of intellectual property litigation see Lanjouw and Shankerman (2001) 




                                                
cover an entire computer program but only certain parts of it (Cohen and Lemley, 2001).38 
Such protection may be limited to one step in an innovation making the patent trivial but its 
impact broad for subsequent innovators (Pilch, 2004). Further, patent protection of individual 
software modules also affects the sequential nature of software development particularly when 
considering each of these modules as complementary products. Cross licensing and patent 
pools, examined below, are regarded in the literature by some researchers (Shapiro, 2001, 
Lerner and Tirole, 2002) as solutions to the patent thicket problem. 
 
Patent law allows agreements known as cross licensing agreements which give two parties 
access to each others patent portfolios. The agreements between companies can be without 
license fees if the patent portfolios are about the same size. In addition, colluding firms are 
able to enter new markets at relatively low costs and collusively set prices. Firms do not 
deviate from these set prices as the threat of punishment increases in repeated games 
(Whinston, 1990). In addition such behavior results in short term equilibria (Shapiro, 2003) 
and often results in increasing barriers to market entry for SME (Regibeau and Rockett, 
2004).39 A related concept refers to patent pools. Patent pools refer to cross licensing 
agreements relating to a particular technology. As such they can also lead to tacit collusion 
thereby increasing barriers to entry for non members.  
 
In general larger companies seem more knowledgeable about formal rights and tend to be 
more successful in their applications and grants of patents (Iversen, 2004). According to a 
study on Norwegian SME, the costs of patents are much higher for a smaller company making 
them either not patent as it is not part of company strategy or withdraw their applications 
(Iversen, 2004). Farrell and Shapiro (2004) find overall that monopoly structures resulting 
from strategic patenting impose high prices on consumers creating inefficiencies or 
 
38 Cohen and Lemley (2001) thus suggest that it is not possible to compare “copyrighted software” in the same 
context as “patented software”.  
39 Companies like IBM, Intel, Hewlett-Packard and Motorola and other European counterparts have large patent 
portfolios allowing them to defensively and offensively keep competitors out of specific market niches and to 
negotiate cross licenses (Smets-Solanes, 2000, 2001, Giuri, Mariani et al 2006). Cohen et al. (2000) empirically 
found that many firms obtain patents in order to block out competition. Licensing is often considered a lucrative 





                                                
deadweight losses40 and extend the breadth of protection where alternative directions of 
innovation are restricted. Thus, based on the above discussion, it can be said that patent 
protection can increase the costs of using existing information (Rossi, 2004) and can reduce 
R&D incentives of competitors (Bessen, 2002).41 
 
Alternatively it could be argued that descriptions provided in patent applications could lead to 
positive spillovers and make inventing around the patent easier. In the following we briefly 
discuss the implications of patent application disclosures. The question whether disclosure is a 
fair stipulation depends on whether disclosure results in a loss of profits to be earned from an 
innovation. If there are no losses from disclosure, then neither static nor dynamic efficiency is 
reduced.  
 
On the positive side third parties are able to reduce their information costs and understand new 
solutions and applications enabling dynamic efficiency. As Blind et al. (2005) point out, in a 
setting with interdependent spillovers, wasteful expenditure on R&D could be reduced. On the 
negative side Crampes and Langinier (1998) found under certain conditions, that firms chose 
not to renew their patents so as to prevent information leakages. This aspect has been 
examined both in the theoretical (Horstman et. al. 1985, Scotchmer, 1991 and Harter, 1993) 
and empirical literature (Arundel, 1998 and Cohen et al., 1998). Such firms normally opt for 
secrecy and forgo patent protection.  
 
However, Levin (1988) and Cohen et al. (1998a) have argued that descriptions given in 
exchange for patent protection are often not clear or precise enough for it to be beneficial to 
others. As a case in point, Arundel and Steinmueller (1998) and Hall et al., (1999) found that 
SME were unable to benefit from information in patent disclosures. However, Arundel and 
Steinmueller (1998) acknowledge that firm size, the use of patents as appropriation methods 




40 Thus when the social value of a patent is high, prices should be high but lower than the maximum willingness 
to pay of users. Price discrimination allows producers to appropriate a larger share of their innovation i.e., license 
fees for software that vary with the number of users. 




The discussion on patents and disclosure poses an interesting question in the context of reverse 
engineering. In the software industry, competition is innovation based implying that disclosure 
is central to sequential and cumulative innovation. As seen before, Weber (2004) suggests that 
reverse engineering is difficult in software which could imply that firms would achieve 
maximum protection from distributing their software in binary code. Thus, the question that 
comes to mind is why does patent protection not require complete disclosure in light of the 
sequential nature of software?  
 
This can be explained as follows; A firm has two options, either it is awarded a patent and 
thereby should disclose all knowledge, as assumed in some theoretical studies including 
Scotchmer (1991), or they choose secrecy. In the former case, there is ample spillover 
opportunity to promote further innovation and reduce R&D expenditure wastage but at the 
same time, innovators are able to enjoy profits from patent protection. This perspective 
provides economic justification for patents rewarded to innovators. In the latter case, there is 
no protection and hence no disclosure which negatively impacts the sequential nature of 
software development. In the current context, patent protection seems to enable both 
monopoly profits and limited disclosure. This is particularly poignant when considering that 
firms may also leverage other options like lead time advantages, technical complexity and 
complementary services to appropriate their investments (Arundel, 2000). However, if these 
profits were to be used in increasing innovation, in the long run, this may increase welfare 
(Arundel, 2000).  
 
In Summary The problem of whether patents are good or bad is difficult to answer both 
theoretically and empirically as the multitude of literature shows. On the positive side, 
Arundel (2001) and Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) suggest that changes in patent law, global 
competition and the increasingly knowledge driven economy has resulted in increased use of 
patents by SME who signal their expertise through this medium. Brouwer and Kleinknecht 
(1999) suggest that some firms compensate for market share, networks and advertising by 
more actively seeking patent protection. Further they suggest that SME that engage in R&D 
collaboration tend to make more use of patents particularly in high tech industries. On the 
negative side, patent protection, considering the strategic motivations results in market failure 





Considering the effects of strategic patenting and the sequential nature of software innovation, 
an efficient patent might perhaps be one that enables spillovers so as spur subsequent 
innovative activity. However this strategy is also not perfect as it could induce the collection 
of many similar patents either by the innovating firm or through cross licensing. As a result 
there is ample opportunity to increase protection for an innovation which consequently 
restricts market entry. It could thus be said that software innovation requires low license costs 
to enable market entry and subsequent investments in R&D by competitors. However, only 
credible circumvention of patents at minimum cost could induce patent holders to provide low 
license fees. Given the absence of a very clear pronouncement on the impact of patents it 
provides ample scope for further research in this area. This provides one of the motivations for 
some of the research and analysis described in chapters that follow.  
 
Overall when comparing the impact of copyrights and patents on competition in the software 
market we find: Though not a panacea, copyrights enables horizontal market entry and 
increases efficient competition and price structures, and therefore maybe the more the viable 
option to ensure innovation. However, it is to be noted that recent legal provisions have 
resulted in copyright law and patent law overlapping a great deal in the context of software 
(Cohen and Lemley, 2001) making this distinction rather weak. 
 
Next we turn to examining OSS as a strategy. 
 
2.3.3 OSS as a strategy  
It is difficult to say which of the two licenses i.e., GPL or BSD is more conducive to dynamic 
efficiency. In general the BSD license seems to provide greater incentives to innovate as it 
allows the combination of open and closed source software to be sold commercially (Schmidt 
and Schnitzer 2002), However, this increased incentive for BSD type software could 
negatively impact the investment structures leading to inefficient levels of software 
differentiation and incompatibilities. This in turn could negatively affect the sequential pattern 
of innovation. The GPL license is an efficient commitment mechanism when innovation is 
dependent on disclosure of information. This license prevents agency cost problems related to 




                                                
fit solutions (Weber, 2004). Thus, due to the compatible and interoperable nature of GPL 
software, switching costs are minimal if not zero (Gehring, 2006).42  
 
In order to ensure that technology develops in certain ways, particularly with reference to 
basic or fundamental innovations it maybe more efficient to have GPL based interfaces and 
open standards (Aigrain, 2002). This in turn would enable downstream applications and 
consequently dynamic competition. It is evident based on the principles laid out in the GPL 
license that it is more attuned to the cumulative and sequential aspects of software innovation 
(Samuelson and Scotchmer, 2002).  
 
At present, most of the OSS applications can run on Windows and other proprietary operating 
systems and thus do not require an open source operating system to function.43 However, as 
commercial exploitation of GPL software is still relatively low, there tends to be inefficiently 
low investments in catering to the mass consumer since open source software primarily caters 
to computer programmers and advanced users. Yet with the growth of OSS, it has been 
observed that there are more applications available for the mass consumer market e.g. Gnome, 
a graphical desktop interface and StarOffice, a package with programmes including a word 
processor, spreadsheet, and several games (Schiff, 2002).  
 
The GPL license, like all other public goods is subject to the free-rider problem where the 
majority of users are passive users.44 Carver (2005) suggests that the perception that open 
source software is ‘free’ makes companies hesitant to develop open source applications which 
could further distort investment structures. The non-proprietary nature of GPL software can 
also negatively impact the innovation and investment incentives of programmers where 
investment structures are dependent only on the OSS programmer/user needs. As such, they 
 
42 Proprietary software is characterized by strong network effects which make costs of switching to another 
network extremely high. 
43 Alternatively proprietary systems can always be made compatible to the open source systems due to source 
code access. This is the case for both Oracle and IBM databases which are able to run on the Linux operating 
system. However, only certain proprietary formats have chosen to make their applications compatible with open 
source operating systems. 
44  Jensen and Scacchi (2007) refer to the ‘onion layer’ model of organization where passive users are located on 
the outer level. The second layers and closer to core finds those who write bug reports, test new and pre releases 
etc. while the core consists of those who contribute the most to the code and in turn have the most 





                                                
may not invest in solving problems or creating software to address fundamental problems of 
general interest (Shapiro, 2003) reducing investment and efficiency levels.45  
 
Thus, firms who want or need certain developments in GPL software must invest in R&D 
themselves which could alleviate the free-rider problem to an extent. This logic suggests that 
the efficiency of GPL licenses should be assessed on the extent of the free-rider problem and 
the difference between the utility of the programmer versus that of societal utility in creating 
software.  
 
In Summary One could argue that all else being equal, there is a strong case for OSS as it 
provides an endogenous solution to many problems resulting from proprietary software46 
(Bessen, 2002, Comino and Manenti, 2003) including increased competition and cumulative 
and sequential innovation as highlighted below:  
- In terms of innovation it considers the sequential nature of software development and 
seems to promote greater competition. By having access to the source code, OSS 
provides transparency47 and reduces the lock-in effect that arises from vertically 
integrated market structures and strong network effects. Hence OSS enables market entry. 
- The start-up costs of OSS are low since the software can be downloaded from the Internet 
for free, though it is not clear whether it always has a lower total cost of ownership i.e., 
learning costs and maintenance costs.  
- OSS does not impose any restrictions on users thereby reducing problems of 
incompatibility and interoperability. All restrictions are relevant only for software re-
distribution after modification. 
 
 
45  The lack of a structured goal limits future expectations and demand. “Forking” is a common occurrence in the 
open source movement where programmes with differing ideologies break off at a certain tangent because they 
feel a project is not heading in the appropriate direction. Varian and Shapiro (2003) believe that this is the 
biggest threat to OSS. In this respect, proprietary software seems to have the upper hand.  
46 Bessen (2002) suggests OSS as a remedy to increase consumer options. Further, Comino and Manenti (2003) 
suggest that this market failure is related in part to users uninformed about OSS alternatives and can be corrected 
through the use of OSS. Their model suggests that increasing OSS awareness increases welfare. 
47 In response, in 2001, Microsoft started the Shared Source Initiative (SSI) where much of the Windows source 
code was revealed to certain pre-approved government and business clients but it was not open for modification. 
Shortly after, in 2003, Microsoft launched the Government Security Program where government clients were 




                                                
The state can encourage the use and development of OSS through direct subsidies (Comino 
and Maneti, 2003, Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2002) or through mandatory use in government 
offices. However, the literature in this area (Evans and Reddy, 2003, Lessig, 2002, Schmidt 
and Schnitzer, 2002, Bessen, 2002) does not favour outright government support of OSS. It 
instead suggests that government should act like any other commercial consumer and market 
forces should decide between the two technology sharing strategies.48 In the case of basic 
innovations that are publicly funded, however, software should be subjected to complete 
disclosure i.e., GPL licensed software (Aigrain, 2002).  
 
Despite all its benefits, the overall discussion above tends to suggest that OSS alone does not 
provide the solution for dynamic efficiency. The inability of one system to cater to market 
needs could imply the need for both systems as briefly examined in the conclusion of the 
entire section below. 
 
In the following we briefly revert to the opening question of this section whether open or 
closed systems are most attuned to dynamic efficiency: Lerner and Tirole, (2002) examine a 
software development model where OSS code is combined with proprietary code. Several 
large technology firms have made selected portion of their software code available and even 
encourage their employees to participate in the open source community. Presumably this 
allows them to channel the open source movement in directions that they would find useful 
(Varian et al., 2004).  
 
Baake and Wichmann (2004) demonstrate the economic forces at work in a hybrid model 
using a stylised model. The model relies on spillovers with two firms having the right to 
choose how much of their software code will be publicly available, i.e., they choose an 
optimal level of OSS software keeping the rest proprietary. Revealing the source code leads to 
lower costs for both firms as they benefit from each other’s openness. However, lower 
software costs can also lead to more intense competition among firms, which could in the end 
raise coding expenses. Moreover, given that entry costs can be low in the presence of OSS 
code, it might also facilitate entry in the market. They show that the final outcome depends on 
the relative strengths of these effects.  
 
48 Bessen (2002) and Lessig (2002) however do propagate the elimination of patent protection for software as the 
most appropriate form of government intervention. Evans (2002) suggests a more moderate approach through 




Further, empirical studies by Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003) and Dalle and Jullien (2003) 
provide evidence showing that the long run will also be characterized by the co-existence of 
OSS and proprietary software. A subsequent study by Bonaccorsi, Rossi and Giannangelli 
(2004) uses a sample of Italian firms to examine the incentives of individual firms in this 
context. They find costs and network externalities to be the most significant determinants of 
firm decisions in producing open and/or closed software. 
 
In accepting the co-existence of both systems in the software market, a natural consequence 
refers to competition between OSS and proprietary software as highlighted by some central 
findings in the literature below. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) develop a dynamic 
mixed duopoly model to examine competition between Linux and Windows. They consider 
Linux to be a no-cost competitor compared to other commercial market players and examine 
whether commercial companies can successfully compete in such an environment or will they 
be displaced eventually. They find a solution where either the operating systems co-exist or 
Windows will push Linux out of the market. If they co-exist, what is clear from simple 
economic theory is that more firms imply greater competition and less profit for the 
incumbents. This could suggest that fewer resources are being devoted to R&D activity by 
commercial firms thereby reducing overall innovation in the software industry. Their analysis 
in favour of Windows is based on the speed of demand side learning and the assumption that 
Microsoft will not be short sighted in its pricing decisions so as to be able to influence 
consumer valuations in subsequent periods. However, despite their findings, the authors do 
acknowledge that cost asymmetries could work in Linux’s favour.  
 
From a demand side perspective, Kuan (2001) theoretically examines whether consumers 
prefer to make their own software i.e., user innovation or buy their software from a proprietary 
vendor. The former is subject to the free rider problem and the latter to information 
asymmetries. She finds that OSS is the more stable option by analyzing data that measures the 
rate of bug fixing. Bitzer and Schroeder (2006) theoretically and empirically show that the 
entry of OSS in to OSS and commercial market segments results in increased competition and 
innovative activity. With the help of a theoretical model they examine the impact of 
competition on innovation by studying the impact of moving from a monopoly to a duopoly in 
the software market. The model shows that having an OSS producer as a competitor increases 





In summary: As evident, the question whether a closed or an open system is better for the 
software market still requires further analysis. What we can however deduce from the 
literature is that both systems exist in the market and to an extent compete against each other. 
Further the literature thus far has not extensively examined co-existence from the point of 
view of SME, prompting the current research to study the same in greater depth. 
  
2.4 Conclusion 
The discussions in the introduction and this chapter have provided some key insights in 
understanding competition within the software market. These key insights enumerated below 
provide the basis for the essays to follow. 
- Sequential and cumulative innovation: This form of innovation forms the crux of 
software development. When considering the two forms of technology sharing strategies, 
OSS and proprietary software, we find: The biggest advantage of closed source software 
is the one conferred by property rights. Ownership of software and the ability to extract 
rents from ownership arguably provides incentives for creative work. However, these 
same positive externalities of proprietary software lead to distortions in investment and 
competition by limiting the sequential and cumulative innovation process. While OSS 
provides endogenous solutions to many of these problems, its most important 
contribution by far is that it promotes sequential and cumulative innovation. 
- Close versus open systems/Co-existence: It is evident that neither proprietary nor open 
source software alone provides a solution for dynamic efficiency in the software market. 
It is however worth noting that these two forms need not necessarily be in competition 
with each other – they can co-exist. Evidence shows that many large corporations that 
have the ability to develop their own proprietary software, e.g. IBM, Sun Microsystems 
and Google, and also invest in open source software (Varian et al., 2004). Currently they 
occupy different market segments with OSS predominant in the web server and database 
markets and proprietary software vendors predominant in mass consumer markets. 
- Spillovers: As seen in the introduction and in this chapter, a central aim of copyrights and 
patents seems to focus on reducing the amount of knowledge spillovers that new 
innovations create. Firms depend on knowledge spillovers from rivals which contribute to 
own R&D investment and spurs subsequent innovation (Jaffe, 1986, Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996). Thus, restricting spillovers negatively impacts innovation structures 




of market entry increase and potential competitors, particularly small and medium size 
enterprises, are locked out. This aspect is further examined in the next chapter. 
 
In summation: The issues discussed here broadly examine specific aspects of software and 
how they affect competition in the software industry. While it is clear that copyrights and 
patents result in static losses and distort competition ex-post, they also provide incentives to 
innovate and ensure competition and therefore a complete lack of protection would also not 
have the desired result. Thus, one needs to weigh the importance of competition ex-post and 
the necessary incentives required to enable innovation ex-ante.  
 
As seen IPR can increase barriers to entry for SME enabling large firms to better exploit the 
benefits of innovation. Research has largely focussed on large firms and their use of IPR 
despite evidence pointing to the fact that SME are highly innovative (Hayward and 
Greenhalgh, 1994). The remaining chapters seek to contribute to the literature on SME in the 
software industry. Specifically the chapters examine the impact of SME on competition in the 




                                                
Chapter 3 
 
3. Bundling, spillovers and quality investments 
3.1 Introduction 
In many high technology markets today, market structure is characterized by the presence of a 
few large firms selling multiple products along with several smaller firms that offer a 
significantly smaller number of products. This phenomenon can be observed in the software 
industry where the large firm vs. niche producers construct is seen in the co-existence of 
proprietary and open source software firms. We begin this essay by listing some stylized facts 
about the software industry which will be used subsequently to develop a model. 
 
It is observed that large producers like Microsoft offer a variety of office applications i.e., 
Word, Excel, Power Point and Exchange to consumers in the form of individual applications 
or in a bundle.  However, since individual applications are more expensive than the bundle, 
most consumers tend to buy the bundle i.e., Microsoft Office. This is the case regardless of 
whether they use other products in the bundle or not.49 Thus, it might be said that consumers 
end up with additional applications they do not necessarily want.50  
 
Much of Microsoft’s innovations are the result of systematic imitation and gradual 
innovation. For example, Microsoft Word is a refined version of previously existing word 
processors. Excel owes much of its success to Lotus 123 while Power Point benefited a great 
deal from Harvard Graphics and other similar programs. Thus, by improving upon existing 
innovations, Microsoft was able to displace other market players. The underlying pattern that 
emerges from these examples is that ideas are not original (Scotchmer, 1991), and the 
ultimate product is a refinement and reformulation of ideas and products that already existed 
in the market. More formally, innovation in software is sequential and cumulative i.e., firm 
innovations depend, benefit and build upon external R&D spillovers. Thus, based on the 
 
49 According to Google Trends (2008), while consumers buy Microsoft Office, the most commonly used 
program is Microsoft Excel. This result varies from time to time as seen in 2006 when Microsoft Word was the 
most commonly preferred tool. 
50 According to Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) and Katz and Shapiro (1998), sellers of information goods are 
better able to extract rent and cover a large customer base when large numbers of information goods are sold in a 
bundle than when they are not, assuming that consumers have independent valuations for the products being 
bundled. This is exemplified by the fact that information goods normally have high fixed costs and low marginal 




                                                
anecdotal evidence above, we observe spillover activity exists within the software market, a 
phenomenon that could perhaps be used to explain the co-existence of OSS and proprietary 
firms as well. 
 
For example, much of the software used to develop operating systems and power the Internet 
is the result of open source code. Notable examples include Apache and Linux upon which 
firms like Google, Yahoo and Amazon power their servers. Microsoft has also made use of 
open source software in several of its software offerings (Varian and Shapiro, 2003). Further, 
several proprietary companies including IBM and Oracle have opened up their source code in 
order to benefit from product improvement facilitated by the open source community. More 
recently51, Microsoft has also agreed to open up some of its software in order to facilitate 
greater compatibility and a more level playing field. However, Microsoft does also 
acknowledge that access to their source code for external parties enables additional products 
which in turn develop further consumer interest in Windows. Thus the aforementioned 
examples highlight the visible spillover activity taking place between the proprietary and open 
source software producers. This spillover exchange seems highly relevant when considering 
that innovation is sequential and cumulative in the software industry and competition revolves 
around innovation. 
 
In general, when a large firm benefits from a smaller firm’s spillovers, microeconomic theory 
suggests that the suitable strategy for the large firm is to merge with the smaller firm. While 
in theory, a merger may be the best solution, in practice, there may not be enough incentives 
to perform all the functions of a firm in-house. In the software industry, the inability to merge 
is further exemplified when considering the OSS ideology.52  
 
The majority of programmers contributing to the OSS movement are unpaid volunteers who 
contribute time and effort developing software code that can be used by third parties for free, 
or for a minimal fee, as building blocks for subsequent innovation (Benkler, 2002).53  Users 
and programmers alike are encouraged to participate in software development i.e., user 
innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, Lerner and Tirole, 2002, Harhoff et al., 2000). 
As the source code is open, individual OSS programmers have the ability to signal their 
 
51 Refer article: Microsoft to share more technical secrets, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/technology/22soft.html  
52 Refer to Chapter 2 for a more lengthy discussion on the ideology of OSS.  




                                                
quality and performance and consequently build a reputation. In addition to the signaling 
incentive, community participation and identification have also been cited as strong 
motivators to participate in the OSS movement (Hertel et al., 2003, Diamond and Torvalds, 
2001, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) where there is no central authority (Lakhani and Wolf, 
2003) but reciprocity (Raymond, 1999).54 These programmers are responsible for their 
projects and have less firm-specific capital resulting in greater fluidity of labor markets 
(Rossi, 2004, Lee, Moisa and Weiss, 2003, Lerner and Tirole, 2002). 
 
This is in contrast to proprietary software development which normally occurs within a 
traditional firm environment where employees are not individually responsible for products or 
performance and where only the functionality and usage of a program is disclosed to third 
parties (Schiff, 2002). As such the differing ideologies make outright mergers between open 
and closed software firms rather difficult.55 Thus in light of this external given, we make use 
of bundling as a possible solution for the large firm to avail of spillovers from small OSS 
firms in the market.  
 
Specifically, we examine the following question: In the context of spillover activity  between  
the  large  producer  and  the  niche  producers,  how  does  bundling  by  the  large producer 
affect the R&D decisions of all the firms in the market? Thus, we focus on two observations, 
namely, the fact that large firms often tend to bundle products and secondly, the fact that there 
exists spillovers between these firms. The goal of this paper is to investigate if there is a 
relationship between these two aspects. To the best of our knowledge, these two aspects have 
not been studied together in the context of high technology markets. In order to better 
understand this relationship, we abstract from all the negative effects of bundling in terms of 
predation, entry and exit and focus only on the effect of bundling on spillovers and R&D 
investment decisions of both the large and niche firms. 
 
 
54 Community participation is considered by some authors (Rossi, 2004, Lakhani and Wolf, 2001, Weber, 2000 
and Raymond, 1999b) to be primary as it is evident that not all OSS programmers will be leaders or highly 
reputed. Thus, it seems that participation in the OSS community takes greater precedence over forking or 
intentional breakaways from the OSS community.  
55 It should be noted that some proprietary firms encourage their programmers to work on OSS projects e.g. 
Google and IBM. Such participation allows proprietary firms to better assess their competition and benefit from 




Therefore, we examine the bundling decision of a large firm faced with the possibility of 
spillovers from two smaller firms already existing in the market. This simplified market 
structure represents the current co-existence of proprietary and open source software firms we 
observe in the market. Our analysis rests primarily on the assumption that spillovers from the 
smaller firms are beneficial to the large firm and as such create this co-existence. We further 
assume that due to various intellectual property rights mechanisms i.e., patents and 
copyrights, spillovers from the large firm to the niche firms are zero. 
 
We consider three varying spillover scenarios: Case 1 where there are no spillovers is our 
benchmark case. Case 2 refers to where there are asymmetric spillovers i.e., spillovers accrue 
only to the large firm. In both these two cases we assume that the level of spillovers is equal 
from each of the smaller firms. Cases 3 and 4 examine the impact of varying spillover activity 
from the individual niche firms. In addition to spillovers, we also consider economies of 
scope to examine whether other aspects contribute to the bundling decision. 
 
Based on these varying spillover frameworks, we examine the effects of bundling by the large 
producer and then compare it to the case when he does not bundle. Similar to Choi (2004) we 
also assume that bundling is a credible commitment and one that can not be easily changed. 
We base this assumption on the visible success of the Microsoft Office package (Nalebuff, 
2004) despite each application being offered individually. 
 
We derive the following results from the formal model: In the absence of spillovers, under 
bundling, Firm 1 will offer a lower price quality pair and has smaller market share than Firms 
2 and 3 who will offer greater qualities. In the presence of bundling and spillovers, we find 
that Firm 1 offers a higher quality but at a lower price and its market share is lower than that 
of Firms 2 and 3. Thus, in equilibrium, Firm 1 will choose not to bundle unless spillovers 
exceed a certain threshold. Once this spillover threshold has been exceeded, bundling is 
always the optimal decision for Firm 1. Further we find when Firm 1 obtains spillovers only 
from one firm, it will not bundle. This finding implies that spillovers need to accrue from 
more than one competitor in order to be beneficial to Firm 1’s R&D and innovation. When 
considering spillovers and welfare, we find welfare to be higher when Firm1 bundles.  
 
Welfare is higher under bundling due to quality increases accruing to Firm 1 through spillover 




                                                
powerful firm at the cost of total welfare. In our model bundling is more of a defensive 
commitment strategy which brings welfare to the consumer and if spillovers are large enough 
we find that it also results in profits for the powerful firm.  
 
Thus, in effect, Firm 1 employs a “puppy dog” strategy56 where it signals soft behavior by 
bundling. In order to induce investment and benefit from spillovers, Firm 1 bundles i.e., here 
bundling is used as a strategic tool. Competitors in the market respond to this soft behavior by 
increasing their quality or R&D investments. We explain this phenomenon of increased 
quality investment by the competitors based on the idea that bundling sends a clear 
commitment signal that Firm 1 will no longer compete in prices. Consequently we find that 
bundling results in the large firm reducing its R&D costs. Contrary to other findings (Choi 
and Stefanadis, 2001, Choi, 2004), we suggest that this reduction in R&D investment by the 
large firm is compensated by an increase in spillovers resulting from increased quality 
investments by Firms 2 and 3. These findings, we believe, suggest a possible reason for the 
co-existence of proprietary and open source software vendors we observe in the market and 
why bundling in this case may actually be beneficial. 
 
In the following, Section 3.2 provides a literature review of selected references followed by 
Section 3.3, the general model setup. Sections 3.4 to 3.7 consider the unbundled and bundled 
case respectively in the context of varying spillover activity and discuss the results and 
implications. Section 3.8 examines the impact of economies of scope. The welfare analysis is 
found in Section 3.9 and the paper concludes with Section 3.10. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
There has been much debate as to whether bundling is an anti-competitive practice. The 
Chicago school (Director and Levi, 1956, Schmalensee, 1982) states that there is only “one 
monopoly profit” and as such, bundling has no additional effect. Others, after modifying the 
Chicago model to reflect risky market conditions, contend that bundling by a monopolist 
allows price discrimination (Stigler, 1968, Adams and Yellen, 1976) which in turn increases 
barriers to entry (Whinston, 1990) thereby increasing profits. A third reason to bundle refers 
 
56 Through this strategic ploy, the firm essentially encourages competition and gives the impression of being 
weak but is not. This is a particularly profitable strategy if it makes the incumbent tougher in the second round 




                                                
to cost savings (Salinger, 1995) resulting from the integrated product; a reason Microsoft 
always highlights when responding to criticisms regarding its tying behavior.57 Regardless of 
the possible synergies, in terms of efficiencies that can occur from a bundle, Nalebuff (2004) 
shows that an incumbent selling complementary products in a bundle, has a substantial 
advantage over rivals who sell applications individually.58 
 
 
However, despite its negative implications, bundling is also a long-term decision that signals 
that a firm will not compete further in prices. Thus, on the positive side for competitors, the 
decision to bundle indicates commitment on the part of an incumbent (large producer) i.e., 
bundling can be used as a commitment device. Whereas on the negative side, it allows the 
integrated firm to enter complementary markets reducing competition (Carlton & Waldman, 
2002) and/or driving other firms out of the market. 
 
Carlton and Waldman (2002) show that if a competitor were to enter the secondary market 
with a superior product complementary to the incumbent’s product, then entry would be 
welcomed. This is due to the fact that some of the profits would accrue to the incumbent. 
However, if the entrant subsequently enters the primary market, the incumbent would lose 
profits. As a result, the incumbent tends to bundle so as to keep the entrant out. Other 
literature (Choi, 2004, Carbajo et al 1990, Chen, 1997) has however indicated that bundling 
need not necessarily remove competitors from the market and yet remain profitable for the 
incumbent. 
 
In other words, bundling refers to a product range being strategically used to deter entry and 
increase profits. This allows the incumbent to remain dominant despite the rapid technological 
change occurring in an industry. On observing the software market, we note that all the 
Microsoft Office products are available individually and that there are open source offerings 
in both the primary and secondary markets. It is obvious, despite this fact that the Microsoft 
package still dominates. Critics of monopolization claim that limiting entry in to 
complementary markets is not beneficial to industries such as software where innovation and 
new products are the result of existing technology i.e., source code is combined and 
 
57 Microsoft tied its operating system with its Internet browser program, Internet Explorer. Important to note is 
that we consider only the bundling of applications. 
58 In particular he considers the success of Microsoft Office and how it successfully displaced existing individual 




                                                
reformulated in new and unique ways (Bessen & Maskin, 2000). This often results in a 
distortion of R&D investment and incentive structures. 
 
R&D decisions within a firm have a major role to play and are normally those undertaken in 
order to improve market positioning. As early as 1962, Arrow explained the phenomenon of 
positive externalities arising from private investment in R&D. Spence and Ghemawat (1985) 
further postulated that firms that benefit from spillovers experience cost reductions from both 
its own learning and that which it learns by way of spillovers from competing firms. Jaffe 
(1986) empirically confirmed this and further found that R&D spillovers tend to benefit third 
party innovation. However, it was Rosen (1991) who suggested that spillover activity among 
firms is often asymmetric. Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002) suggest that asymmetric 
knowledge spillovers promote inequality among firms due to free riding.59  
 
Industries like software are primarily based on technology and know-how where the benefits 
of spillovers depend on the absorptive capacity of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). As software depreciates only with newer versions and 
innovations, competition in this market is considered innovation based. Further, as innovation 
in software is cumulative (Scotchmer, 1991), it could be said that entry and the presence of 
competing firms maybe something that the incumbent firm requires in order to ensure in-
novation.60 This maybe a way for the monopolist to continue making profits and keep ahead 
of the rest (Dasgupta & Stiglitz, 1980) even when there is a large number of competitive 
entrants all of whom have a similar pool of knowledge (Lyons et al. 1988). 
 
 
In general, literature on the effect of bundling on R&D investment considers the impact on the 
entry and exit of competing firms. These papers contend that bundling by the incumbent tends 
to reduce R&D investment incentives on the part of the competitor or entrant. Choi and 
Stefanadis (2001) consider a “risky upfront investment” and assume that two products; A and 
B, only have value when they are consumed together. Their findings suggests that bundling 
 
59 However, contrary to this paper, they assume that the more a firm knows, the less it benefits from spillover 
activities.  
60 A point to note is that R&D costs are often compensated for with patents and other forms of intellectual 
property protection. This might have counter balancing effects for innovation: As Arrow (1962) pointed out, low 




results in reducing the entrants’ (in our case the existing competitor’s) incentive to invest and 
innovate because the entrant with only one product is unable to compete. 
 
In a later paper by Choi (2004), he states that in the presence of R&D competition, bundling 
tilts the market in favor of the incumbent as it can spread its costs over a larger number of 
units making it cost ineffective for other firms. Thus, the exit of competing firms is not 
relevant. He further contends that due to this cost reduction achieved through bundling, 
entrants are less willing to invest in R&D. Gilbert and Riordan (2006) also consider the effect 
of bundling and how it affects incentives to innovate. They find that though bundling leads to 
foreclosure there could be an increase in social welfare.  
 
Similar to our study, Nalebuff (2004) examines the bundling of applications by the incumbent 
i.e., Microsoft Office, but considers how bundling results in the exit of competing firms. He 
considers two goods A and B and two strategic players in the market where one is an 
incumbent and the other is a challenger. Nalebuff (2004) goes on to show that if the 
incumbent has market power in both products A and B, by bundling he puts the challenger, 
with market power only in one product, at a disadvantage. This, he suggests, could induce the 
challenger to exit the market.  
 
In our paper we examine the decision to bundle on the part of the large producer and examine 
how this decision affects its competitors. We contend that bundling is a strategy tool i.e., 
puppy dog strategy, used by the large producer in order to induce quality investments by the 
competitors. These quality investments in turn benefit the large producer’s own R&D through 
spillover activity and as a result decrease the large producer’s costs. Thus, we consider 
spillover externalities between competitors. We find that bundling with spillovers always 
results in additional welfare for the consumer and when quality increases are large enough it 
leads to increased profits for the large firm. The following section presents our model in detail 
and solves the one stage Hotelling game. 
 
3.3 Model 
We consider a market comprising of three firms that sell four differentiated products. Firm 1 
is the integrated firm that sells two products − product A and B, while firm 2 provides product 
C and firm 3 provides product D.61 We assume that applications A and D are substitutes as are 
B and C. We also assume that the products sold by Firm 1 are located on one end of the 
product spectrum while D and C are at the other end. Without loss of generality, we further 
assume that A and B are located at the left end of the unit interval while D and C are at the 
other end. 
 
Consumer behavior. We assume that there are consumers who only wish to buy one of the 
two applications − those who wish to purchase either A or D and another set that chooses 
between applications B and C. These two groups are completely separate and no consumer 
wishes to own both products i.e., consumers derive value from only one product and the 
products can be consumed independently. Consumers for each of the two applications are 
distributed uniformly along the unit interval.  
 





Here q1 and p1 denote the quality and price respectively of the product sold by Firm 1 
(regardless of whether it is A or B), while qk and pk denote the same variables for the other 
two firms.  Note that V can be interpreted as the base utility from having the application while 
q is the utility derived from the quality of the application. It is a scale parameter which 
ensures that consumers always have positive utility and hence every consumer buys the 
product. Also in order to prevent the consumers from favoring one application over the other, 
it is assumed that the value of V is the same for both applications.62 This allows us to write the 




                                                 
61 Entry and exit are not issues considered the model. Following Choi (2004) it is assumed that the firms are 
already in the market and have incurred sunk entry costs.  




Equating the utilities from A and D we can obtain the location of the indifferent consumer 
denoted by λAD as follows: 
 
Similarly, for the second group of consumers who prefer either B or C we obtain the 
indifferent consumer λBC 
 
Profits. Based on the afore-derived equations, we can write the profit functions of the firms.  
In the first stage of the game, Firm 1 decides whether or not to bundle. If the large firm does 
not bundle then it sells to consumers separately in the two different markets and it sets 
individual prices for products A and B. If it chooses to bundle then pA = pB = p. However in 
this case, consumers in both markets buy both products, without deriving any utility from the 
second product. We assume that the decision to bundle creates no cost advantage or 
disadvantage to the integrated firm. 
 
We first consider profits from the unbundled case. The third and fourth terms denote 
production costs of applications A and B which is a function of the quality of the product as 
well as spillovers from the other firm. Thus, in the third term α denotes the spillovers that 
Firm 1 obtains from Firm 3 and in the fourth term it captures the spillovers obtained from 
Firm 2.  It is clear that such spillovers lead to lower costs for firm 1. Note for simplicity we 
assume that the value of spillovers from both firms 2 and 3 are the same. Later in the paper 
we consider the implications of relaxing this assumption. 
 
where π denotes profits and the superscript refers to the fact that this is the unbundled case.   
 
The profits of firm k = 2, 3 can be written respectively as 
 




We now consider profits in the bundled case. In this scenario Firm 1 sells both products A and 
B together and charges a common price, i.e., pA = pB = p. The location of the indifferent 
consumer remains unchanged and is given by: 
 
Similar to the profits derived in the unbundled case, the profits for the bundled case are 
defined as follows: 
 
 
Profits of Firms 2 and 3 are the same as before except for the fact that the profit function now 
has a superscript b denoting bundling by Firm 1. 
 
Further, we will assume throughout that α > α˜ ≥ 0 i.e., that spillovers from the competing 
firms to Firm 1 are higher. Our reasoning for this assumption is based on the idea that 
intellectual property protection like patents and copyrights used by proprietary software 
makers prevent spillover exchanges to the open source firms i.e., α˜ = 0.  Additionally, 
differing license agreements within the open source community allow for differing amounts 
of spillover appropriation.  The open source licenses can be broadly divided in to the General 
Public License (GPL) and the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD). The former license 
creates limitation on use due to its viral nature, while the latter license allows for 
appropriation of open source without having to give anything back. Thus, due to the existence 
of the BSD license, our assumption that α > α˜ is further strengthened.63  
 
Thus the cost functions above capture the idea that spillovers from competing firms contribute 
to own innovation resulting in improved products implying  that the higher are the spillovers 
to Firm 1, the lower are Firm’s 1 costs. Observe that in our case, spillovers increase with 
competitor activity. Additionally, the quadratic cost function implies that large increases of 
quality come at large costs. Therefore in addition to R&D spillovers accruing from the niche 
                                                 
63 Currently however, large software companies like IBM and Sun Microsystems are voluntarily publishing 
source code enabling access to the GPL community which in turn allows their source code to be improved upon. 
This is then combined with their other services and sold thereby increasing the quality of their products. Thus, 




producers, the opportunity to spread costs also provides incentive for the large producer to 
play soft, i.e., bundle. 
 
Timing of moves.   In  our  three  stage  game  the  timing  of  moves  is  as  follows64: 
Stage 1: The large firm (Firm 1) decides whether or not to bundle products A and B. 
Stage 2: Based on this decision, all three firms chose their quality levels.   
Stage 3: In this stage all firms set prices for their products based on decisions taken by all 
firms in the first two stages. 
 
The timing of the game indicates that bundling and quality investments are long-term 
decisions and ones that are not easily changed, unlike price decisions. Thus, the decision to 
bundle, we assume, is a credible commitment signal to competitors in the market. 
 
3.4 Results 
In this section we will compare the results of the bundled and unbundled cases obtained by 
using backward induction in our three stage game. 
 
3.4.1 The unbundled case 
We begin by solving for the unbundled case. Recall in this situation Firm 1 sells applications 
A and B separately and can set a different price in each market. 
 
3.4.1.1 Price game 
Each firm chooses price pj, j = A, B, C, D in each market to maximize its own profit given the 
other firm’s price. Substituting the λ in to the profit functions and assuming interior solutions, 
we obtain equilibrium prices in terms of own quality and the competitor’s quality in each of 
the two markets. 
 
Two facts stand out here.  First, observe that the price reaction functions are symmetric. 
Second, as expected we find that there are no interdependencies across the two markets.65
                                                 
64 In our model the large firm’s bundling decision is followed by all firms’ decisions regarding qualities and 





In order to obtain the quality decisions, we substitute the prices obtained in the previous stage 
in to the profit function. Differentiating the profit functions we obtain the optimal quality 
decisions first for the integrated firm i.e., the reaction functions of Firm 1 given the effect of 
spillovers from Firms 2 and 3: 
 
We assume that quality investment is an effort made by the seller in order to induce greater 
consumer buying and therefore is always positive. Again as before, we see that the quality qA 
of product A is dependent only on the quality qD of product D and the spillover parameter α.  
Similarly, qB depends only on qC and the parameter α.  Note if we assume α = 0 i.e., no 
spillovers, we find that qA (qD) and qB (qC) have a negative relationship. However, when α > 
0, i.e., spillovers exist, the higher the α, the greater is the impact of qD and qC on qA and qB.  
Thus, we find a positive relationship between qualities A and D and qualities B and C.  
 
Given the new qA and qB, the optimal quality decisions for the other two firms are provided 
next. 
 
Again observe that if α˜ = 0, we find that qualities qC (qB) and qD (qA) have a negative 
relationship.66 Additionally by comparing the reactions functions, we observe that the 
interdependencies between the qualities are symmetric. To sum up, if there are positive 
spillovers, α > α˜ ≥ 0, then the more Firms 2 and 3 invest in quality, the higher are the benefits 
to Firm 1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
65 The range of qA, qB,  qC,  and qD is such that interior solutions exist. 
66 For the sake of argumentation, if α˜ ≥ 0, the higher the spillover, the greater is the impact of qA and qB on qD 
and qC  However, due to the line of reasoning taken in the paper, we assume that spillovers from proprietary 




3.4.2 The bundled case 
In the bundled scenario, Firm 1 bundles products A and B and charges a common price p for 
both products. All the other steps in the game remain the same. 
 
3.4.2.1 Price game 
In the price sub-game, from the first order conditions we obtain the following equilibrium 
price for Firm 1. 
 
Similarly, for products C and D equilibrium prices are given by:  
 




D are symmetric as in the 
unbundled case, they are quite different from their values in that scenario. 
 
3.4.2.2 Quality decisions 
Using the optimal prices from above we obtain the stage two profit functions. Maximizing 
Firm 1’s profit functions, we obtain the reaction functions shown below. Note that qA and qB 
are symmetric and both depend on the qualities of application C and D, but not on each other. 
 
The new reaction quality functions of products C and D are shown below. Again observe that 
these reaction functions are symmetric and quite different from their unbundled counterparts.  
Moreover, unlike the reaction function for A and B, these reaction functions depend on the 





Unfortunately, these reaction functions do not lead to simple closed form solutions, making it 
impossible to solve the general model. However, we are able to obtain the necessary insights 
about the relationship between bundling and spillovers by considering some special cases for 
which the model can be solved. This follows next. 
 
3.5 Results under no spillovers 
Our first set of results concerns the situation with no spillovers, i.e., α˜ = α = 0. This will serve 
as the benchmark case since it will explain the role of bundling without any additional factors. 
 




For the unbundled case, as one would predict we find that the equilibrium outcome is 
symmetric. In equilibrium all three firms have the same prices, qualities and profits. As a 
result of bundling however, we observe changes in firm qualities, prices and profits. We find 
that Firm 1 offers lower quality than Firms 2 and 3 and also charges a lower price. From the 
location of the indifferent consumer we also see that Firms 2 and 3 have a larger market share 
than Firm 1. Thus bundling leads to an equilibrium situation that is no longer symmetric and 
Firm 1’s profits are lower than the sum of the profits of the other two firms. We now 
summarize our results in the proposition below. 
 
Proposition 1: In the absence of spillovers, bundling leads to an asymmetric outcome. In this 
outcome Firm 1 offers a lower price quality pair and has a smaller market share than the two 
remaining firms.  In equilibrium Firm 1 will not bundle the products and Firm 2 and 3 also 
prefer this outcome. When observing the qualities, we find a marked increase in the qualities 





The intuition for this result is fairly clear. Given that Firm 1 has to produce A and B 
separately, even though it sells them for the same price, it faces strong pressure to reduce 
costs. So in equilibrium firm 1 will lower its quality and offer the two products at a lower 
price. Given the reduction in quality it also loses some market share to the other firms.   
Anticipating this, as a best response Firms 2 and 3 raise their quality and price. This also 
allows them to garner a greater market share. The increase in quality by the fringe firms 
softens the intensity of price competition and allows product differentiation i.e., open source 
offerings.  This implies, in this case, that if there is no competition, there is no increase in 
quality. 
 
3.6 Results with asymmetric spillovers 
In the previous section we see that in the absence of spillovers, under bundling, the large 
producer’s quality investment decreases. The decision to bundle also seems to induce greater 
quality investments by the other two firms. 
 
In this section we introduce spillovers to see how it affects the bundling decision. Recall that 
the general model lacks a closed form solution and to obtain a solution it is necessary to 
simplify. Here we assume that there are no spillovers from the large firms to the small firms 
or α˜ = 0. However, the large firm obtains spillovers from the small firms. One way to 
interpret this assumption is to claim that a large firm (like Microsoft) protects its “own 
knowledge” through patents and copyrights and hence no spillovers accrue to smaller firms.  
To start with we assume that α = 1. We explore the implications of changing α later in this 
section. 
 








Examination of Table 2 reveals that it is different from Table 1. We see that under bundling 
Firm 1 offers a higher quality product at a lower price and loses some market share. As in the 
previous case, profits are still higher in the unbundled case. 
 
Comparison with the benchmark case however provides some interesting insights. We find 
that spillovers always lead to quality increases in products A and B regardless of the bundling 
decision. The combination of bundling and spillovers leads to the highest quality levels for 
Firm 1. Compared to the benchmark case with no spillovers, Firm 1’s market share always 
exceeds 1/2. Despite spillovers, costs of production are still high relative to spillovers such 
that Firm 1 prefers not to bundle. For Firms 2 and 3 we find that bundling always leads to a 
higher quality choice, presumably because they assume lower price competition from Firm 1.  
However, we also find that qualities are higher under the no spillover case regardless of the 
bundling decision of Firm 1. Therefore the highest quality level is obtained in the presence of 
bundling and no spillovers. We summarize our findings about Table 2 in the proposition 
below. 
 
Proposition 2: In the presence of spillovers we find asymmetric outcomes for both the 
bundled and unbundled cases. In the presence of spillovers and bundling Firm 1 offers a 
higher quality but a lower price, and has a lower market share than the other two firms. In 
equilibrium Firm 1 will not bundle the products and Firm 2 and 3 also prefer this outcome.   
Further in presence of bundling, we find a marked increase in the qualities of Firm 2 and 
Firm 3 as compared to the unbundled levels. 
 
The intuition for this result is also clear. The difference in the current proposition arises from 
the fact that the bundling decision on the part of Firm 1 allows it to benefit from asymmetric 
spillovers from Firms 2 and 3. Thus Firm 1 is able to increase its quality and charges a lower 
price to sell to both sets of consumers. Through increased quality levels, Firms 2 and 3 are 
also able to increase their market share. However, relative to costs the spillovers are still not 
high enough to make it worthwhile for Firm 1 to bundle. 
 
The next proposition shows that there exists a threshold value of α beyond which it is 
profitable for Firm 1 to bundle products A and B. To investigate the importance of spillovers 
for bundling we consider the implications of raising the value of α. This is shown in the table 
below. 
Table 3: Asymmetric Spillovers  (α = 4.9) 
 
 
From the table above, it is evident that bundling is suitable strategy for Firm 1 after a certain 
threshold value of spillovers has been reached. The point at which Firm 1 is indifferent 
between bundling and unbundling occurs at α = 4.867. As evident from the above table, 
profits from bundling exceed unbundled profits for α ≥ 4.9.67  
 
Proposition 3:  In the presence of spillovers α > 4.9 and bundling, we find that Firm 1 offers 
a higher quality and price pair and has a higher market share than the other two firms. In 
equilibrium Firm 1 will always bundle. Once again we observe that the qualities of Firms 2 
and 3 increase when Firm 1 bundles. 
 
The intuition for this is as follows. Bundling always induces the non-integrated firms to raise 
their quality levels.68 However if the benefits to the large firm in the form of spillovers from 
these higher quality levels are not sufficiently large, then Firm 1 will not bundle. Once the 
level of spillovers crosses the threshold value, it lowers cost of production sufficiently 
through substantial increases to Firm 1’s own qualities, leading to larger profits and making it 
worthwhile for the large firm to bundle.69 
 
Thus, bundling is beneficial to the incumbent firm when it’s own innovations benefit from 
external R&D spillovers. Hence, it makes sense for the incumbent to pursue a puppy dog 
                                                 
67 The actual point at which bundling profits exceed unbundled profits is α = 4.868. However, for the sake of 
illustration, we employ α = 4.9. It is to be noted that rounding up the alpha value does not change the results 
obtained under the case α = 4.868. It just makes the results more pronounced. 
68 Note: Due to increased spillover activity, Firms 2 and 3 have lower qualities than before. 





strategy or play soft initially and encourage competition in order to benefit from increased 
quality investments from the niche firms. We contend that the compensatory increase in R&D 
by the competing firms avoids duplication of research efforts but at the same time allows 
diversity of research since both the incumbent and competing firms continue R&D efforts. 
 
Till now we have assumed that Firm 1 gets the same amount of spillovers from both Firms 2 
and 3. Now we explore what happens when Firm 1 gets different spillovers from the two 
different firms.  So let αD denote the spillovers that accrue from Firm 3 and αC denote the 
spillovers from Firm 2. We still retain the assumption that neither Firm 2 nor Firm 3 gets any 
spillovers from Firm 1. For the sake of illustration consider the situation where αD = αc =1/2.  
Observe that the pattern here is similar to the one shown in Table 2. Results for this case are 
shown in Table 4 below.  
 
Table 4: Asymmetric Spillovers (α = 1/2) 
 
Next we consider the case where αD = 1 and αC = 0. The results for this are given in Table 5 
below.  For both these cases notice that the total spillovers for Firm 1 add to the same value 
(αD + αC = 1).70  As before we observe that for Firm 1 the unbundled case yields higher profits 
than the bundled case. However there are some interesting differences. Under bundling Firm 1 
prefers to have spillovers from both firms, while it prefers spillovers only from one firm when 
it does not bundle the products. Profits are also the highest in this case. Moreover, under 
bundling Firm 2 gains at the expense of Firm 3, which alone provides all the spillover benefits 
to Firm 1.  
                                                 





Table 5: Asymmetric Spillovers (αD = 1, αC = 0) 
 
This case is also interesting for another reason. Table 1 considers the case of no spillovers 
while Table 2 covers the situation when Firm 1 benefits from spillovers from both firms.   
Table 5 considers the situation when Firm 1 has spillovers from only one firm and therefore 
allows us to isolate the differences caused by spillovers and bundling. We find that for Firms 
2 and 3 quality increases always lead to an increase in the market share.71 This is not always 
the case for Firm 1. We observe that spillovers always lead to quality increases for Firm 1.   
Keeping spillovers constant however, we find that Firm 1 offers a higher quality when it 
bundles but has a lower market share. As expected, profits of Firm 1 are always higher when 
it benefits from spillovers. Hence when it obtains spillovers only from one firm, Firm 1 
always prefers not to bundle the products. Additionally as previously noted, the firm that does 
not provide spillovers gains at the expense of the firm that does.  
 
We also calculated values for αD = 9.8 and αC = 0 and further to see the impact of increased 
spillovers on Firm 1’s decision.72 We find that the results obtained in the case where αD = 1 
and αC = 0 hold for increased spillovers too. Thus, it is clear that Firm 1 needs spillovers from 
both firms to bundle i.e., spillovers from only one product will not induce bundling. The 
following proposition summarizes the findings for all the cases considered here. 
                                                 
71 Note: This does not apply when α ≥ 4.9. 




Proposition 4: The large firm always benefits from spillovers but, in equilibrium will always 
choose not to bundle the two products.  The qualities of Firm 2 and Firm 3 increase in the 
bundled case even in the presence of varying spillovers from Firm 2 and Firm 3. 
 
3.7 Results with symmetric spillovers 
Though we contend that the spillover activity from the large firm to the smaller firms may be 
negligible due to IPR protection, for the sake of argument we consider the symmetric 
spillovers case as well, i.e., we set α˜  =  α.  Figure1 represents spillovers which vary from 0 
to 1 on the x-axis and the profits of Firm 1 on the y-axis. We find that symmetric spillovers 
lead to lower profits regardless of whether the firm bundles or not. This makes perfect sense 
since the large firm is not only benefitting from but also providing spillovers to the niche 
firms, which reduces its revenue.73 However, profits from bundling are still lower than when 
the firm does not bundle.  As before this is because we are in the range where costs are high 
relative to the value of spillovers. 
 
Figure 1:  Firm1 Profits and Symmetric Spillovers 
 
Figure 2 shows the quality levels (y-axis) of the large firm in the context of symmetric 
spillovers (x-axis).  We see that as α increases from 0 to 1, quality levels increase for both 




                                                 
73 This is an interesting finding in the light of recent happenings where Microsoft, due to anti-trust legislation has 
been asked to make available documents in order to make the market more competitive. Microsoft predicts that 
this sharing will have a relatively minimal impact on its revenues. In this scenario, it makes little sense for the 
large producer to play soft as he has little incentive to do so. 
in the unbundled case since bundling motivates the other two firms 2 to raise their quality. 
Hence when the spillover value is greater than 0.4 the benefits to Firm 1 in the form of 
spillovers make it feasible for the firm to bundle. 
 
Figure 2:  Firm 1: Qualities and Symmetric Spillovers 
 
For Firms 2 and 3 there are no surprises. As α increases both firms invest more in quality and 
as before quality investments are higher under bundling. Based on this one could speculate 
that in the absence of IPR, the quality of products might be higher, though the revenues are 
lower for the large producer. 
 
3.8 Economies of scope 
From the section above, three main results emerge:  First, in equilibrium, the large firm will 
always choose not to bundle as long as α < 4.9 whereupon bundling becomes more profitable 
than unbundling.  Second, the increases in Firm 2 and Firm 3 qualities occur only when Firm 
1 bundles. Third, Firm 1 will only bundle when it receives spillovers from more than one 
competing firm. 
 
In order to examine whether there are factors other than spillovers which determine the 
bundling decision, we introduce economies of scope which are often characteristic of high 
technology markets. We speculate that in providing a bundled product instead of two 
individual products, Firm 1 makes a cost saving through economies of scope. Accordingly, 
we adapt this idea in to the bundled profit function as shown below where the entire cost 





In order to assess the impact of economies of scope, we set α = 1/2 and calculate the 
remaining values. These are given in the table below. The values of the unbundled case 
remain the same as calculated in the asymmetric case with spillovers α = 1/2 (Table 4). We 
find the profits of the large firm to be higher in the bundled case with economies of scope. We 
find in the presence of low spillovers, bundling and economies of scope, the large firm offers 
significantly larger qualities at higher prices and gains greater market share through the same. 
 
Table 6: Asymmetric Spillovers (α = 1/2) 
 
We summarize our findings with the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5:  In the presence of economies of scope and bundling, very low spillovers are 
required to make bundling a profitable strategy. Thus, in equilibrium, Firm 1 will always 
choose to bundle. It is evident from the above result that spillovers contribute greatly towards 
making bundling profitable. 
 
3.9 Welfare analysis 
This section examines total welfare for society in our price quality game.  The following 
equations denote consumer surplus for products A and B and products C and D respectively. 
The equations thereafter denote total welfare which is calculated as the sum of consumer 





Based on the above equations, we can calculate welfare at equilibrium levels for all four cases 
i.e., unbundling and bundling with no spillovers and unbundling and bundling with spillovers. 
Note that in this section profits for Firm 1 include profits from both products A and B. 
Moreover, V has not been added to the consumer surplus results as they would only increase 
the scale of the existing results. Similarly, consumer surplus is the sum of surplus from both 
applications.  
 
We begin with Table 8 which considers the α˜ = α = 0 case, or the no spillovers case.  As is 
evident, total welfare is higher under bundling. Profits of all the firms decrease under 
bundling. However, the consumer surplus of those buying products from Firms 2 and 3 
increases due to the higher quality offered by these firms. Though quality increases raise 
costs, the decrease in profits is small when comparing the increase in consumer surplus. 
Consequently, welfare is higher under bundling. 
 
Table 7:  Welfare under No Spillovers 
 
 
In Table 9 we consider the case of asymmetric spillovers or α˜ = 0 and α = 1. As in Table 8 
we find consumer surplus to be higher for Firms 2 and 3 and lower profits for all the firms in 
the bundled case. This is due to the higher quality choice made by Firms 2 and 3 under 





The intuition for this result is as follows. When there are spillovers the large firm is able to 
make use of these and lower its costs, which allows it to offer a higher quality. Since the 
spillovers are asymmetric they provide no benefits to the two smaller firms. Consequently the 
profits of Firm 2 and 3 do not vary much, though there is some improvement in consumer 
surplus under bundling. The major effect on total welfare is through Firm 1’s consumer 
surplus obtained through increased qualities, from Firms 2 and 3, which are higher when Firm 
1 bundles.  
 
Another interesting finding is that the profits of Firms 2 and 3 only differ marginally in all the 
four cases. We also find that the presence of spillovers leads to higher welfare regardless of 
the bundling decision. 
 
Table 8: Welfare under Spillovers 
 
We also calculated the total welfare values for α = 4.9 to gauge the impact that increased 
spillovers and Firm 1 profits may have on welfare. As evident from the table below, the main 
result obtained for the case α = 1 still holds i.e., increased spillovers and bundling seem to 
increase total welfare. In fact the higher the level of spillovers, the more significant are the 
increases to total welfare. We find that with increased spillovers and bundling, Firm 1’s 
consumer surplus drastically increases. Firm 1’s increased quality results from spillovers from 
Firms 2 and 3 bringing about a positive shift in market share under bundling. This is in 
contrast to the no spillover case where Firm 1’s market share decreases on account of 
bundling. Further we find Firm 1’s profits are higher in the bundled case inducing it to 
bundle. The consumer surplus of Firms 2 and 3 under bundling also increases in comparison 
to the α = 1 case. This could be explained by the increased quality choice made by Firms 2 
and 3 in the bundled case. As in the previous case, we find that the profits of Firms 2 and 3 




Table 9: Welfare under Spillovers 
 
The proposition below summarizes our finding about welfare. 
 
Proposition 6: Welfare is higher under bundling when there are no spillovers. In the 
presence of spillovers welfare is higher when Firm 1 does bundle products A and B. 
 
We find as a result of the welfare analysis that in this context, bundling is not an aggressive 
strategy but instead a defensive commitment strategy i.e., puppy dog strategy on the part of 
Firm 1 which brings additional welfare to the consumer. This increase in welfare is brought 
about by quality increases in Firms 2 and 3 which are carried over to Firm 1 by way of 
spillovers. If the spillovers are large enough, not only does total welfare increase, the profits 
of Firm 1 also increase. 
 
3.10 Conclusions 
This paper examines the relationship between the bundling decision of a large firm and the 
impact of spillovers on innovation within the software industry. Using a linear city model, we 
assume that there exists a complementarity in the form of spillovers between the large firm 
and the two open source firms. This set-up captures the co-existence observed in the software 
market between proprietary and OSS firms. We suggest that OSS firms provide innovative 
potential for proprietary software firms. As such it makes sense for the large player to use 
bundling as a strategy tool where he appears soft and encourages competition so that he may 
benefit from cost reductions and increased quality investments through spillovers accruing 
from the competitive fringe. We consider decisions to bundle and investments in quality as 









We find that bundling does increase price competition but it encourages the competing firms 
to invest in R&D by sending a clear commitment signal. In fact, it is only on account of the 
bundling decision that firms 2 and 3 increase their quality levels and is not motivated by an 
increase in profits for Firms 2 and 3. A part of this increased quality is carried over to the 
integrated firm in the form of spillovers reducing the production costs of the integrated firm.  
The effect of bundling was examined in varying spillover scenarios based on the assumption 
that there are only asymmetric spillovers. 
 
 
In short, we find that in the absence of spillovers, under bundling Firm 1 will offer a lower 
price quality pair and has a smaller market share than Firms 2 and 3 who will offer greater 
qualities. In the presence of bundling and spillovers, we find that Firm 1 offers a higher 
quality but at a lower price and its market share is lower than that of Firms 2 and 3. Thus, in 
equilibrium, Firm 1 will choose not to bundle unless spillovers reach a certain threshold i.e., α 
> 4.9.  After which point, bundling becomes the suitable strategy for Firm 1 as profits from 
bundling and spillovers are higher than no bundling with spillovers. In fact, after this 
threshold the profits of Firm 1 are always higher than the no spillover case. We further find 
that Firm 1 will not bundle when it receives spillovers only from one firm i.e., one product. 
This suggests that the incumbent needs several competitors who provide spillovers in order 
for spillovers to benefit own innovation. This corroborates earlier findings which suggest that 
many firms are needed for continuous innovation and ideas (Varian et al., 2004). When 
considering spillovers and welfare, we find welfare to be higher when Firm 1 bundles. 
 
 
Based on our paper, it could be said that by bundling, a large firm like Microsoft is able to 
benefit from the R&D investments made in the open source community. This finding provides 
a possible explanation for co-existence i.e., the underlying interaction which allows both open 
source firms and proprietary firms to function in the market reducing overall R&D 
expenditure and duplication and yet ensuring diversity. Further, small firms may innovate at a 
faster rate making spillovers from such firms more valuable to large firms. This can be seen in 
the example of Microsoft’s recent source code disclosures aimed at not only leveling the 
playing field but also to ensure R&D takes place and continued consumer interest in its 
products. This finding also reinforces the cumulative and sequential aspects of innovation 
prevalent in the software industry and the importance of spillover activity. However, 








The paper is limited to the extent that it largely considers the bundling decision in the context 
of spillovers save a brief examination of economies of scope. More extensive analysis of 
economies of scope and network effects, excluded here due to limitation in the current cost 
function, are highly relevant for analyzing innovation strategies in the software market. Future 
research should therefore, consider the bundling decision and its impact on spillovers, 
network effects and economies of scope simultaneously. 
 
Another limitation is that we only make a horizontal analysis of the situation at hand.  
Therefore future research should examine the impact that a vertical structure within the 
software market i.e., large firm catering to the mass consumer versus small competitive firms 
who cater to sophisticated users, would have on this question. Finally, in this paper we 
assume that α is exogenous. The next step would therefore be to endogenize α so that firms 
can chose how much information they want to reveal. 
 
3.11 Appendix I 
The  following  tables  examine  the  impact  of  increasing  α  values  on  Firm  1’s  profits 
and subsequently its bundling decision. We calculated α values equal to 4, 4.5, 5, 6, and 7.  It 
is evident that the increase in spillovers is accompanied by significant quality increases in 
products A and B. Further Firm 1’s profits and market shares steadily increase with increased 
spillovers. While the qualities of Firms 2 and 3 increase, their profits, prices and market 
shares decrease. This could perhaps be attributed to the fact that increased asymmetric 
spillovers to the integrated firm bring no benefit. As evident from the tables below, from α ≥ 
5, Firm 1 will always bundle before which it will not as the profits from unbundling are 
higher. 
 
Asymmetric Spillovers (α = 4) 
 
 






Asymmetric Spillovers (α = 5) 
 
 
Asymmetric Spillovers (α = 6) 
 
 




3.12 Appendix II 
The tables below examine the impact of increasing αD. As evident spillovers from one firm 
and unbundling leads to greater profits for Firm 1. Therefore in equilibrium Firm 1 will not 
bundle. Further, we find that increasing this value does not overturn the decision of Firm 1 not 
to bundle as long as it receives spillovers only from one product or firm. Once again the 
competing firm that does not give spillovers gains at the expense of the firm that does. 
 
Asymmetric Spillovers (αD = 9, αC = 0) 
 
 













                                                
Chapter 4 
 
4. Small and medium sized firms and IPR adoption 
4.1 Introduction 
Recent literature argues that the knowledge a firm possesses in terms of intangible assets 
contributes greatly to the competitiveness of firms (Albert and Bradley, 1997). In fact, small 
and medium sized enterprises have been identified as significant contributors to the knowledge 
pool and innovative activity. As early as 1962, Muller showed that much of Du Pont’s 
innovations came from small firms external to the company. Thus in order to protect their 
intellectual property (IP) in negotiations with large firms, be it collaboration or competition, 
some form of intellectual property rights protection mechanisms must be undertaken by SMEs, 
particularly when the firm deals in knowledge based activities. However, it is not clear to what 
extent IPR plays a role in the SME innovation process. While much attention has been paid to 
large firms and their use of IPR as incentive mechanisms to innovate, not enough attention has 
been paid to small and medium sized firms in the same context. This paper contributes to the 
literature by providing new and additional insights to the literature on SME and IPR adoption. 
 
IPR can be broadly divided into formal and informal mechanisms. The former refers to 
patents, copyrights, trademarks and registered designs.74 The latter includes lead time 
advantages, secrecy and market dominance. Research suggests that SME largely rely on 
informal IPR mechanisms as the existing legal framework does not consider the unique 
requirements of SME which includes the inability to commercialize innovations, a lack of 
financial means and the inability to litigate. As a result, the environment provided by formal 
IPR is rather weak.  
 
Weak IPR could have two implications. Firstly, if IPR are weak, SME don’t have enough 
incentive to create the technology (Gambardella, 2007). Second, even if they do innovate, they 
are often integrated by larger companies either upstream or downstream (Gans and Stern, 
2003). As an alternative to IPR, it has also been noted that SME tend to make use of open 
source software (OSS) or open systems. The ideology of the OSS movement eliminates many 
 
74 In this chapter we briefly cover trademarks and registered designs as they feature in the dataset. However the 




                                                
of the obstacles currently facing SME in terms of cost, litigation and distribution.75 Firms that 
employ or create OSS tend not to patent.  
 
Despite studies that point to the low usage of formal IPR mechanisms by SME, there are some 
industries for which IPR is quite relevant even for small firms. These industries that offer 
primarily knowledge based products and services include pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and 
ICT (information and communication technology). In fact research suggests (Moulin et al., 
2005) that SME in the ICT sector are more aware and avid users of the formal IPR system. 
 
Our aim in this paper is to examine SME adoption patterns in the ICT sector. ICT industries 
have short product cycles but high R&D costs where the use of IPR could help in 
appropriating profits. ICT manufacturing industries tend to appropriate most of their profits 
through licensing agreements (Elevald, 2007). These industries are also characterized by open 
innovation and research collaborations. The onset of the Internet, has made copying large scale 
and firms are coming up with other strategies and business models to protect their IP which 
includes double licensing with open source software.  
 
Thus, we begin with the premise that these sectors are using IPR as a base condition. We 
employ a dataset from the e-Business watch project76 which is confined to SME in the ICT 
manufacturing sector, software sector and ICT services sector. In doing so, we are able to 
examine whether ICT SME do indeed use IPR and whether it plays an important role in SME 
innovation. 
 
75 The OSS ideology uses a formal IPR mechanism i.e., copyright in order to grant freedom of use, modification 
and redistribution of knowledge protected under its licences. The specific conditions of each license vary and are 
only relevant upon distribution.  
76 See www.ebusiness-watch.org for further information.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Diagrammatic representation of various factors affecting SME adoption of IPR 
 
The diagram above provides a visual description of the research model used in this paper. We 
make use of the analysis of variance in order to study the impact of varying one factor and its 
subsequent effect on the other variables in the model. The former refers to, as indicated in the 
diagram, globalization, legal frameworks, cooperative research and OSS use and adoption. We 
examine how these four factors affect IPR adoption by ICT SME. We further postulate that 
these four factors have differing impacts on the adoption of IPR by ICT SME. These factors 
are studied in greater detail in the following sections. The diagram also depicts possible 
relationships that might be further clarified through our analysis including the effect of 
globalization on legal frameworks and vice versa, how legal frameworks influence 
collaborative research and whether OSS use is also a form of cooperative research.  
 
Our analysis brings out the following four important results. First, while it has been suggested 
that globalization has affected the use of IPR, most studies till date have focused on firm 
innovation or R&D as the major determinant of IPR adoption. Our study attempts to find 
whether a correlation exists between the exact tendency of SME to patent and globalization. 
There appears to be little (if any) literature that suggests that this correlation has been 
examined before. Second, we examine whether there is a correlation between cooperative 
research and IPR adoption. Third, we examine whether the relationship between legal 







                                                
SME context as well. Finally, we customize the study in the context of OSS to examine 
whether there is an association between the development and deployment of OSS and the 
propensity of SME to patent.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief general overview of 
IPR mechanisms. Section 4.3 provides a literature review of the four entities mentioned in the 
introduction, namely, innovation, the generation of IP, SME and IPR. This overview indicates 
gaps in the literature and focuses on the contributions of this paper towards these gaps. Section 
4.4 examines the research questions in detail and formulates testable hypotheses. Descriptive 
statistics, data analysis and a discussion of the same are provided in Section 4.5 and the paper 
concludes in Section 4.6.  
 
4.2 IPR Mechanisms in brief 
IPR are unique in that they make a public good excludable and allow inefficiency during the 
granted period (Acs and Audretsch, 2005). The innovator is able to charge a monopoly price 
and recoup what he incurred in terms of R&D cost in developing the innovation. Thus, from a 
theoretical perspective, IPR are designed to create incentives to innovators and to ensure that 
these innovations are brought in to the public domain as soon as possible.77 As previously 
stated, IPR can be broadly divided in to formal and informal IP mechanisms where the former 
refers to patents, copyrights, trademarks and registered designs among others. The latter 
includes lead time advantages, secrecy, market dominance and advertising. We now briefly 
revisit the formal IPR mechanisms.  
 
4.2.1 Patents 
A patent, perhaps the most debated IPR instrument, is granted to an innovator for originality, 
novelty, and non-obviousness in exchange for early disclosure in to the public domain. They 
protect the new technical application of a particular idea but not the idea itself (Lemley and 
Cohen, 2001). Patents expire 20 years after the filing date and are not subject to renewal. 
When comparing with other solutions, patents, it has been suggested in the theoretical 
literature, provide some relief to the market failure arising from innovators being unable to 
appropriate their investments (Gallini & Scotchmer, 2001, Scotchmer, 2004). The decision to 
patent or not is theoretically modelled as a profit maximisation choice of firms (Choi, 1990, 
 




                                                
Anton and Yao, 2004, Langinier, 2005) where only some of the inventions are patented. These 
models abstract from the differences that exist across industries, firms, and innovations, all of 
which affect the propensity to patent (Griliches, 1990, Kleinknecht et al., 2002).  
 
The effect of patent strength on innovation was empirically studied by Lerner (2001) where he 
examined 60 countries over a period of 150 years with respect to policy shifts. In his results, 
Lerner (2001) finds an inverted ‘U’ shape relationship between patents and innovation where 
low levels of protection result in greater innovation and vice versa. In 2000, Cohen et al. 
studied R&D labs in 1478 firms from the US manufacturing industry for the year 1994, to 
examine what mechanisms firms use to extract most profit from their innovations. They found 
that informal IPR mechanisms to be more important to firms in the US manufacturing 
industry.78 Hall and Ziedonis (2001) studied patenting behaviour using data collected from 110 
semiconductor firms during the period 1975-1996 where patents were found to be quite high 
even after controlling for R&D expenditures and size of firms. They suggest that pro patent 
policy shifts within the semiconductor industry created a situation where innovators used 
litigation as a means to obtain rents from possible infringers. Thus, leading Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) to suggest that resources that are invested in expanding patent portfolios are removed 
from research.  
 
Much of the existing empirical literature on the impact of patents is based on surveys across 
various industries which focus on large firms’ appropriation of innovation. However, it has 
been suggested that examining such issues, on a firm by firm basis, within a particular industry 
still remains scant (Mann, 2006). Mann (2006) focuses on patenting behavior within the 
software industry and finds that patenting behavior can vary within an industry too.79 His 
dataset includes both large and small firms in the software industry from the late 1990s which 
allows analysis of the software industry after the rise of the Internet and the legal measures 
which made patenting easier. Mann (2006) finds that the sectors with the highest propensity to 
patent include among others operating systems, database, security, wireless/mobile and 
application service providers. 
 
 
78 For similar findings, refer to Arundel (2001) and Anton and Yao (2004). 
79 Graham and Mowery (2003) published the most extensive study on IPR in the US software industry. Refer: 
Stewart J.H. Graham and David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the US Software Industry, in 




                                                
4.2.2 Copyrights 
The second form of formal IP protection refers to copyrights. Copyrights protects the 
expression of an idea but the not idea itself. Therefore, while direct copying is not allowed, 
copying the underlying idea is. The duration of copyright protection within the EU is usually 
the life of the creator plus either 50 or 70 years after. In Europe, copyrights are obtained 
automatically for creative works once they are made public in some form and there is neither a 
formal application process nor an official register. Software was traditionally protected by 
copyright and though patents are being granted80, software has generally flourished under the 
copyright regime as it does not prohibit subsequent or cumulative innovation.  
 
The presence of IPR within the software market has made way for an alternative endogenous 
solution namely, open source software which allows access to the source code i.e., disclosure 
of core information. The principles of which are also governed by copyright but referred to as 
“copyleft” and serve as a contract to all to read, modify, and use the software where possible 
constraints are only relevant upon distribution.    
 
It has been often said that patents contribute more to innovation because they encourage more 
information disclosure as compared to copyrights. A study by Lerner and Zhu (2005) 
empirically consider patents and copyrights to be substitutes in the protection of software in 
the US. They evaluated the impact of the Lotus vs. Borland case which resulted in a decrease 
in the use of copyright protection for software. Based on this result, they postulated that a 
reduction of one must lead to an increase in the other. They consider two subsets of firms: 
those more directly affected by the Lotus vs. Borland decision and the other subset of firms 
not directly affected by the decision. They examine the shift in behaviour of the first group in 
comparison to the second subset of firms. Their results show that the decision to reduce 
copyright protection for software in the Lotus vs. Borland case resulted in dramatic patenting 
increases. Further they found that increased reliance on patenting was correlated to the growth 
of R&D expenditures, number of employees, sales volume, market capitalization and number 
 
80 Patents are more effective in preventing imitation than copyrights in the software market. However, it should 
be noted that software patents are only granted in the US. However, alternative practices such as computer 
implemented inventions (CII) are developing in Europe. There is no official definition of CII, however, based on 
various court decisions, it seems evident that when a process or piece of software requires hardware, then the 





of business lines.  Thus, their results show that patenting did not have any negative effects on 
innovation.  
 
4.2.3 Trademarks and registered designs 
Trade marks refer to badges of origin for goods or services, and can be words, names, logos, 
colors, sounds or shapes (Gowers, 2006: 15). Trade marks must be registered and once 
registered, others are not allowed to use them. However, they lose their protective value when 
what it represents becomes the general term for items of a particular class. An example refers 
to Sony’s ‘walkman’ which no longer has trade mark value in Austria (Gowers, 2006:15).  
 
Registered designs refers to protection firms can obtain related to the appearance of a product 
which includes colours, shapes, contours, texture, materials and/or the product itself. The 
granting of a registered design prevents against third party copying. In Europe, registered 
designs are granted for a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 25 years through renewals. 
Firms must register them either with national authorities or get a community registered design. 
Often industrial design is used in conjunction with registered designs.  
 
In general, based on the above literature, one can say that there is an overall increase in the 
use of formal IPR which research suggests can be attributed to three main reasons (Arundel, 
2000): First, the change in legislation which has made patenting easier particularly in the US. 
This also includes international agreements from the WIPO (World Intellectual Property 
Organisation) or EPO (European Patent Office) through which firms are able to extend their 
IPR from their home territory. Second, we observe the changing attitudes of firms regarding 
IPR and the final reason refers to the focus of innovation moving from mechanical engineering 
to that of knowledge based activities where competitive strategies are based on knowledge and 
innovation. These three reasons have led to what some experts refer to as the ‘pro-patent’ era.  
 
However, the situation in Europe is somewhat different when considering IPR. European firms 
are generally considered to be behind their American and Japanese counterparts. In fact, an 
empirical study carried out by Arundel (2000) shows that European firms patent less in 
comparison to American firms. Based on a study by Arundel and Kabla (1998), it should be 






In the case of SME, patents are used to signal expertise, enable research collaborations or 
investment (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). As noted, SME are often the drivers of innovation 
especially in the areas of information technology and biotechnology. It is in this area that we 
seek to provide additional insights on whether SME particularly in the area of knowledge 
based products and services (software, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology) are indeed making greater use of formal IPR mechanisms.  
 
4.3 Literature review 
Schumpeter (1942), Galbraith (1952) and Chandler (1977) all believed that larger firms had a 
critical advantage with respect to innovation and that small firms lack the knowledge assets 
required for innovation. Their logic was based on the fact that R&D is a risky and costly 
undertaking and hence industrial organizations of large monopolistic firms offers decisive 
welfare advantages and as such are able to achieve scale economies, diversification, and 
market reputation (Scherer et al. 1959, Cohen 1995). It was Acs and Audretsch (1988) 
however, who suggested that both small entrepreneurial firms as well as large established 
firms facilitate innovation and technological change.  
 
Smaller firms have a greater role to play depending on the type of industry involved and 
spatial contexts (Acs and Audretsch, 2005). In high tech markets (software, pharmaceuticals, 
telecommunication), innovation is highly competitive and small firms are in a better position 
to fully exploit it and take over from the incumbent (Malerba, Orsenigo, and Peretto 1997). 
The use of capital and labour resources has been shown to be more efficient by smaller firms 
(Acs & Audretsch 1991b) combined with their focus on new innovative technologies (Hicks et 
al 2001).  
 
Intellectual property protection in these industries is justified on the basis of high initial costs 
which are difficult to appropriate when considering minimal reproduction and distribution 
costs. However, IPR was ideally designed for isolated innovations resulting from R&D. 
Though this is a useful framework, it does not accurately describe the case where research is 
cumulative whereby earlier researchers provide the basis of innovation for subsequent 
innovators. The WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) in their 2003a report 




                                                
formalize innovations, to signal competence and attract funding and reduce wasteful 
expenditure through cooperative R&D. 
 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) suggest that small firms patent in order to be able to use their IP as a 
bargaining tool with larger firms. The concept of using IP as a credible bargaining tool was 
further examined by Arora and Merges (2004) and Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001) 
who found that it is particularly relevant as most buyers are large firms. By using empirical 
case studies they suggest that small firms have greater chances of assuring their independence 
and returns from IP the more customized the innovative input.  
 
Alternatively, Gambardella (2007) suggests that the innovation elasticity of using IPR is 
greater for small firms than for large ones who can rely on alternative measures to protect their 
innovations. The use of informal IP mechanisms varies from firm to firm (Kuusisto, 2007, 
Cohen et al., 2000). A study by Kitching and Blackburn (1998) showed that firms in computer 
services, design, electronics and mechanical engineering found that informal IP mechanisms 
were cheaper, more effective than formal IPR and they believed result in lesser misuse and 
loss of IP. Arundel (2001) using the Community Innovation Survey in Europe shows that in 
general firms find secrecy to be a more relevant IP mechanism than patents especially for 
SME. He explains this by suggesting that firms are wary of information disclosures which 
might affect their competitive advantage. This aspect has been considered previously by 
Horstmann et al. (1985), Scotchmer (1990)81 and Harter (1993) and empirically by Arundel et 
al., (1995) and Cohen et al. (1998).  
 
However, Arundel (2001) also suggests that as firms increase in size, patents become a more 
important IP mechanism than secrecy for product innovations while finding no such 
relationship for process innovations. In a related study, Kitching and Blackburn (1998) further 
found that those SME possessing IPR preferred not to litigate upon infringement and preferred 
to use their resources for future innovation. Interestingly their results show that the adoption of 
formal IPR varies with the owners’ perception of the innovation’s market value and with 
increased size of the firm.   
 
 
81 Theoretical models in general assume that all innovations are patented unless there is some reason why not 




To summarize, the aforementioned literature review highlights that the use of IPR is normally 
related to firm innovation where the decisive input in the production function is new 
knowledge generated by R&D (Cohen and Klepper, 1991, 1992). This new knowledge is then 
protected using either formal or informal IPR mechanisms. As seen in the previous sections, 
there is an extensive amount of literature covering the use of both formal and informal IPR 
mechanisms though the bulk of this literature is partial to large firms and their use of IPR.  
 
However, it is evident from later studies that SME contribute significantly to the innovation 
and knowledge pool. This could in part be attributed to the changing nature of production 
activities where in recent times, greater emphasis is being laid upon knowledge and innovation 
based products and services. In particular this refers to the areas of biotechnology and 
information technology where SME tend to be more IPR savvy than their counterparts. 
Though these ideas have been explored in the past, studies on specific industry sector and use 
of IPR still remain limited (Mann, 2006). Our paper contributes to this area of the literature 
where our dataset, which focuses exclusively on SME across eight countries in the ICT 
industry, enables us to examine whether the ICT industry promotes greater use of IPR and 
what the main motivators of formal IPR adoption within this sector are. It further highlights 
possible insights to whether knowledge based industries do result in higher levels of patenting 
by SME. 
 
Research suggests that SME tend to make extensive use of informal IPR mechanisms which 
often tend to be cheaper and more effective. However, it has also been suggested that size 
impacts upon the use of formal IPR though some SME still prefer to use informal IPR 
mechanisms to avoid loss of competitive advantage. Due to the evident ambiguity, we 
examine this issue in the context of SME in the ICT industry and combine both the size 
difference within this segment and the impact of this industry being exclusively dependent on 
knowledge based innovation.  
 
We further contribute to the literature by studying the use of IPR by SME within the ICT 
industry in a co-existence framework. This framework provides insights on how OSS affects 
the adoption of IPR within the ICT industry as measured by our dataset. Our final and most 
important contribution to the literature lies in the use of globalization as a determinant of IPR 




                                                
4.4 Research gaps and hypotheses 
When considering early patenting behavior, one finds that innovative activity was 
concentrated in areas of close geographic proximity (Sokoloff, 1988, Jaffe et al, 1993, Moser, 
2005): Mostly in cities and areas close to transportation facilities. Thus, knowledge spillovers 
were found to be highly localized. Moser (2005) analyzed geographical data on locations of 
innovations at a palace fair and data on the location of workers between 1841 and 1901. She 
finds that certain industries that originally focused on secrecy to protect their innovations, 
once patenting was introduced, these same innovations became more diffused. In other words 
she finds that the need for geographical proximity decreased with the onset of patents, 
particularly for the manufacturing industry. Patents enabled innovators to sell their inventions 
to adopters in different locations and promote subsequent economic activity and spillovers. 
Thus, patents enabled geographic diffusion.  
 
In present day context, the onset of globalization has resulted in geographic dispersion and 
necessitated that firms become more competitive. A global industry is referred to as one where 
there is intense competition, standardized products, presence in key international markets and 
significant levels of international trade (Morrison, 1990). In general, high technology sectors 
tend to be more globally oriented and need patents to protect their innovations in the 
international market. Arundel (2000) suggests that those firms involved in R&D tend to patent 
more and firms that want to enter or export to foreign markets also find patenting important.  
 
Johansson and Yip (1994) find in the context of globally integrated competitive strategy that 
firms who chose to go ‘global’ need also to consider strategy changes to suit the global 
environment. Drezner (2001) suggested that as firms become more international there is a 
natural convergence that takes place in terms of traditional national policies. Johansson and 
Yip (1994) contend that this integrated strategy to be pursued by global companies should 
facilitate greater benefits of globalization. However there is limited evidence regarding the 
presence of such global strategies.82 
  
 
82 It should be noted that the benefits of globalization including cost reductions (Kogut, 1985), improved 
qualities (Yip, 1989), increased competitive leverage (Hout et al., 1982; Hamel and Prahalad, 1985) are 





We suggest that IPR adoption can be considered as one such global strategy that could be 
applicable to firms and perhaps also relevant in the SME context. The ICT industry can be 
classified as a global industry which depends solely on technological and knowledge based 
sustainability (Thoenig and Verdier, 2003). Put more simply, knowledge based firms are 
constantly looking for ways to maintain their market position and protect their IP.  
 
Existing studies examine the question of IPR adoption from a more restrictive perspective by 
centering on innovation as the main determinant of IPR adoption. A survey of the relevant 
literature shows that the correlation between the tendency to patent in the ICT industry and 
globalization has not been studied before. Thus, based on the above discussion, the logical 
intuition that follows is that there is a positive correlation between globalization and the 
adoption of IPR. We further postulate that this is particularly relevant for the ICT industry 
which is highly global with production, distribution and knowledge being created all over the 
world. Thus, we formulate our first hypothesis.  
 
H1: Companies with a higher number of patents exhibit higher levels of geographic 
dispersion.    
 
Next we turn to the reasoning behind our second hypothesis. Research (Blackburn, 2003, 
Thumm, 2006) indicates that the main reasons for lack of use of IPR by SME are the costs of 
IP protection, enforcement of IP rights, the time it takes to process an application and limited 
awareness. A survey (Arundel and Steinmueller, 1997) carried out on Dutch SME in five high 
technology sectors showed high application costs, defence costs and information disclosure as 
the main reasons for not using patents. Application costs primarily refer to patent costs, 
particularly the Euro-patent which is more expensive than American or Japanese patents. 
Important to note is that patents can only be applied for at the national level which implies that 
firms wanting to extend the IPR to another country must apply and incur costs once again. 
This also includes costs of translating the patent in to the local language. Further when 
considering how innovation works in these sectors i.e., through sequentiality, the patent 
system seems to be too cumbersome and time consuming to keep pace with the short time-to-
market and the rapid need for new products. Litigation costs i.e., defence costs, with large 






According to the empirical study by Arundel (2000), it seems as though American firms favor 
IPR more as a means to facilitate independent innovation while their European counterparts 
favor IPR more as a means to share information through licensing or negotiations. Large firms 
are better informed about IPR systems and tend to obtain patents more frequently than SME. 
In fact the study by Cohen et al., (2002) found that the main reasons to patent were defensive 
i.e., to prevent copying, block competitors and limit or prevent lawsuits. A study carried out 
on Norwegian SME (Iverson, 2004) showed that large firms have a higher success rate of 
actually obtaining a patent. The author suggests that formal IPR has a larger role to play in the 
large firm’s business strategy which is not necessarily the case for SME.  
 
However, non-use of the formal IPR system also has negative effects which include wasted 
resources, duplication and litigation costs arising from infringements (Hall & Ham, 1999 and 
2000). Pitkethly (2007) showed that limited knowledge about foreign patent laws combined 
with high costs resulted in restricting SME from patenting abroad. SME contribute much to 
innovation and as such may benefit a great deal from protection of innovative ideas.  
 
While it is evident that there are many studies capturing the ineffectiveness of the current 
patent system for SME in terms of various costs, it is not clear whether SME would actually 
increase their use of formal IPR were the system revamped. Several studies indicate that SME 
believe that formal IPR mechanisms are more subject to misuse of IP and loss while informal 
methods are cheaper, more effective and tend to protect SME better (Kitching and Blackburn, 
1998). SME still have less patents in absolute numbers than large firms (Iversen, 2002, Hanel, 
2004, Gambardella, 2005) though it is still higher for those firms that are in the ICT industry 
who tend to be more informed about formal IPR methods, though they too rely largely on 
copyright (Moulin et al., 2005). Therefore we postulate the following: 
 
H2: If legal frameworks were to be strengthened and made more SME friendly, SME would 
patent more.  
 
Our third hypothesis is related to the lack of resources that SME tend to face and how they 
counter the same. Arrow (1962) in his theoretical model suggests that when IPR exist, 
competitive firms are more likely to innovate than monopolists. However, this model does not 
consider the financial situation of SME who are often more competitive than the incumbents 




(1993) show that firms that are best suited to ‘exploration’ are not always the ones best suited 
to ‘exploitation’. Mann (2005) suggests on the basis of an empirical study that small firms 
often have very valuable technology patents but are not able to enforce them. He further 
contends that this situation improves as firms grow. Thus, often SME need to license their IP 
in order to be able to commercialize their innovations. SME depend a lot more on licensing 
revenues for their future ventures than large firms do. Licensing reduces wasteful research 
imitation thereby allowing an inefficient patent in terms of length and breadth to be more 
optimal. 
 
A very recent study carried out by Byma and Leiponen (2007) in Norway on innovative small 
firms in the Finnish manufacturing and service sectors shows that regardless of the industry, 
level of R&D intensity, innovations or R&D cooperation, the smallest firms rarely benefit 
from patenting. An explanation for this could be the lack of resources to commercialize 
various innovations. Thus, it seems that the benefits of IPRs for SMEs are mixed, on the one 
hand it gives them greater bargaining powers but at the same time they face greater litigation, 
reducing the net value of their patents. A solution to this scenario is in the form of cooperative 
research. Gambardella and Arora (1995) find in their study of the biotechnology industry 
found that small firms account for a significant amount of innovative activity but are unable to 
commercialize them. They observe that the result has been a new division of labor where the 
research is conducted by SME and the commercialization by large firms. 
  
Research collaboration has been found to increase the propensity of firms to patent i.e., the 
percentage of innovations that are patented (Brower and Kleinknecht. 1999, Baumol, 2002). 
Arundel (2001) also finds weak evidence to state that firms collaborating in R&D ventures 
tend to patent more. Though there is scant evidence on the impact of research collaboration 
and the adoption of IPR, the existing studies seem to indicate that research collaboration does 
indeed play a role for SME adoption of IPR. The propensity to patent is different across 
sectors and firm size where high tech sectors have a higher propensity to patent than low tech 
sectors. Firms can use patents as a signaling mechanism to other firms in the market (Long, 
2002). This enables them to attract funds, investment capital and research partners. We 
consider this particularly relevant for SME start-up firms in the ICT sector who generally tend 
to have only knowledge as their core asset which we believe should induce greater use of 





                                                
H3: The more SME participate in cooperative research, the higher are the chances that they 
will use formal IPR methods. 
 
Our final hypothesis is related to the use of open source software and SME. Moulin et al., 
(2005), based on a study of Nordic firms and their use of IPR, found that firms involved in the 
production or use of open source software (OSS) tend to have more clarity regarding formal IP 
mechanisms i.e., copyright has a strong role to play in open source management. It should also 
be noted that companies that focus on OSS tend not be in favor of the patent system. This 
applies particularly to the ICT manufacturing sector which applies patents the most. Further 
firms that engage in OSS development place great importance on interoperability whereas 
formal IPR tends to inhibit the innovation and interoperability process (Farrell, 1995). Blind et 
al., (2003) studied German software enterprises and found that those firms developing OSS 
software were greatly inhibited by IPR. OSS provides several solutions to the problems of 
formal IPR mechanisms. 
 
As evident, the economic literature provides a rich variety on the adoption of IPR and on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the same and the use of open and closed (proprietary) source 
software. However, there are very few papers (Bitzer, 2004, Casadessus-Masanell & 
Ghemawhat, 2003, Kuan, 2001) which examine the co-existence of open and closed source 
software and its impact on the adoption of IPR and there appears to be little work done which 
has examined this question in relation to SME. We believe that this co-existence is highly 
relevant to IPR adoption and provides SME an alternative opportunity to protect their IP. 
Therefore we formulate the following hypothesis. 
 
H4: If an SME deploys and/or develops open source software, then the propensity to patent 
decreases. 
 
4.5 Data collection, analysis and discussion 
The dataset used in this paper is derived from the e-Business watch83 project launched by the 
European Commission and its main purpose is to monitor the adoption, development, and the 
impact of electronic business on different sectors across Europe. As of 2007, the project also 
collects data on specific topical reports one of which was a survey on SME use of IPR in the 
ICT industry. Our data is confined to the European Union where SME form the bulk of firms 
 




representing 99% of all enterprises (European Commission 2005) across Europe. Prior to the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU 25 had around 23 million SME in 2005 
(Schmiemann, 2006). Thus, focusing our study on SME has particular relevance to the 
European context. 
 
The dataset that we use for our analysis is based on firms in three sectors that produce 
information technology defined by the NACE Rev. 2 classification.84 The segments included 
in the same are ICT Manufacturing (manufacture of electronic components, manufacture of 
computers and peripheral equipment, manufacture of communication equipment, manufacture 
of computer electronics), software (publishing of computer games, other software publishing) 
and ICT services (telecommunications, information service activities). SME in this context 
refer to those firms with less than 250 employees which is further subdivided in to micro (1to 
9 employees), small (10 to 50) and medium (50 to 250). A total of 683 SME firms in the 8 
countries (Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, The UK and Ireland) were 
questioned and the breakup is given below in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Break –up of firms by segment and size 
ICT Manufacturing  
  3-9 76 
  10-49 93 
  50-249 92 
IT Services  
  3-9 51 
  10-49 55 
  50-249 34 
Software Publishing  
  3-9 104 
  10-49 102 
  50-249 76 
Source: eBusiness Watch 
 
Our dataset, numbering 260 observations, allows us to compare the countries and sector as we 
                                                 
84 NACE refers to the General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities within European Communities. It 
was a classification originally created by Eurostat in 1970. The NACE Rev. 2 refers to a four digit classification 
of business activities and a revision of the NACE Rev. 1.1 classification. It came in to effect on January 1st, 
2008.  
have data from firms of a specific size and R&D class allowing us to standardize the survey 
results. For the purpose of our analysis, we employ the one way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) test which is a common and powerful statistical procedure which performs pair-
wise correlations. The one way ANOVA tests for differences among sample means across 
three or more independent variables which represent a single predictor. In our case, the single 
predictor i.e., the dependent variable is the use of IPR by SME measured by the use of 
patents.85  
 
The ANOVA enables two independent estimates of population variance referred to as a) 
between groups sum of squares (denoted as Sum of Squares Treatment - SSTR) and b) within 
groups sum of squares (denoted as Sum of Squares Error - SSE). The former refers to the sum 
of squared differences of each sample mean from the group means of all the samples under 
consideration. The latter refers to the sum of squared deviations of each mean from the sample 
mean. An ANOVA tests whether the mean variances within the sample are greater than the 
mean variances between the groups of samples. This is established through the construction of 









85 It was not possible to individually compare the various formal IPR mechanisms (patents, copyrights, 
trademarks and registered designs) and whether SMEs prefer one form of formal IPR to another. This was due to 
a measurement bias resulting from differences across cluster size.  
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(K -1) and (N – k) refer to the degrees of freedom for SSTR and SSE respectively. The new 
values can be referred to as between mean squares treatments (MSTR) and within mean 
squares error (MSE). If the former is significantly larger than the latter variance and the p 
value is less than the value at the .01 level of significance, then the hypothesis is accepted, 
otherwise rejected. By performing an ANOVA we are able to distinguish where the difference 
between these groups lies and pinpoint the main area of difference. 
 
In the following we conduct the data analysis and provide short inferences for each result. 
 
4.5.1 Geographic dispersion 
Table 4.2: Descriptives 
 
We first tested the impact of global dispersion on the use of formal IPR. Respondents were 
asked to identify their most significant market i.e., regional, country or international market. 
An analysis of the descriptives shows that the means vary across the different sectors i.e., 
regional, country and international, indicating that the number of patents held across the 
sectors varies. This result points to a positive relationship between geographic dispersion and 
the number of patents. 
 





Table 4.3: ANOVA 
 
 
From Table 4.3, it is evident that there is a significant relationship between increased market 
reach and the number of patents a company applies for (Table 4.3 shows a 0.038 level of 
significance). In other words, the further a company’s geographic market expands i.e., from 
regional, country to international, the more number of patents they seem to employ. In order to 
further substantiate our results we conducted a third level of analysis, namely multiple 
correlations.  
 
Table 4.4: Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:  B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
In Table 4.4, we observe that variables (I) and (J) are the same. This denotes that we are using 
the same variable but grouping it differently to be able to find the sources which lead to 
significant variances. We find from the results of the Tamhane86 test that all the market moves 
are significant i.e., an expansion of market (country to international, regional to country and 
                                                 
86 We made use of the Tamhane test in this context because it does not require the homogeneity of variances and 




regional to international) has a positive impact on the number of patents held. Thus, we 
conducted three levels of analysis to ensure the robustness of one of our main findings. 
 
One possible interpretation of this finding could be that as a firm expands it earns greater 
revenue and therefore is more able to afford and employ formal IPR. Thus, it could be said 
that as an ICT SME firm expands geographically, its ability to compete increases which 
increases its adoption of IPR. 
 
Globalization: As the geographic reach of an SME expands so does the tendency to 
patent. 
 
4.5.2 Legal Frameworks 
In order to consider the impact of legal frameworks on SME use of formal IPR, respondents 
were asked a series of questions regarding the effectiveness of IPR. The first descriptive table 
examines firm responses on whether IPR stimulates knowledge creation and innovation. Once 
again we find there to be a variance in the means which indicates a positive relationship 
between the number of patents and legal frameworks which aid in the creation of innovation.  
 
Table 4.5: Descriptives 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
In performing an ANOVA, it is evident that there is a significant relationship between the 
level of patenting and the ability of legal frameworks in enabling knowledge creation and 
innovation in a company. This result indicates that ICT SME rely on the patent system to 
further innovation. It could further imply that the adoption of IPR can enable SME to sell and 
develop their innovative output. Thus enabling market entry to compete or collaborate with 




Table 4.6: ANOVA 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
In further determining the impact of legal frameworks, firms were asked whether IPR is well 
suited to firm needs. Observing the means in the descriptives table, we observe some variance 
indicating possibly a positive relationship between the level of patenting and the suitability of 
the legal framework.  
 
Table 4.7: Descriptives 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
However on moving to the second level of analysis, ANOVA, we find that though there is 
relationship between the level of patenting and whether the legal framework is suited to a 
company’s needs, the relationship based on the sample size is not significant.  
 
Table 4.8: ANOVA 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
Respondents were further asked whether the legal framework of IPR should be reformed to 
become more effective for SME. In examining the descriptives of firm responses to this 




Table 4.9: Descriptives 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
We find that the between groups mean square is substantially lower than the within groups 
means square indicating that there is not so much variance across the groups and only within 
the groups. The ANOVA table shows us that though there is a relationship between the level 
of patenting and the reforming of legal frameworks, due to the sample size, the relationship is 
not significant. This result could provide evidence to the already existing literature that SME 
prefer informal methods for protecting their IP. This finding could further imply that ICT SME 
consider informal methods more efficient in enabling market entry and competition. 
 
Table 4.10: ANOVA 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
The last measure used to describe legal frameworks refers to cost. Firms were asked if the 
existing legal frameworks for IPR were too costly. Once again, we find that the means vary 
only marginally. In moving to the second level of analysis, we find that the between groups 
mean square do not vary and the variance comes from within in groups. 
 
Table 4.11: Descriptives 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
Surprisingly, however, we find that the relationship between costs and the level of patenting is 




in adopting formal IPR by SME. High costs are also considered as impediments to market 
entry. 
 
Table 4.12: ANOVA 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
 
We find through our analysis that this linear relationship between cost and the level of 
patenting not to be relevant for ICT SME. It is worth pointing out that ICT SME may earn 
more than their other counterparts suggesting that cost may not play a significant role in the 
adoption of formal IPR. This result provides basis for future research.  
 
Thus, as business processes like legal frameworks aid in the generation of knowledge 
conducive to innovation, the level of patenting increases. 
 
4.5.3 Cooperative research 
The next factor that we examine is cooperative research. Firm were asked whether they 
participated in co-operative research projects with other firms. From the descriptive tables we 
observe varying means indicating the possibility of a positive relationship between the level of 
patenting and co-operative research.  
 
Table 4.13: Descriptives 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
I
In the ANOVA table, we find that the between groups mean square is greater than the within 
groups means square clearly indicating a relationship between the level of patenting and 
participating in cooperative research.  However, perhaps due to lack of data, the relationship is 





Table 4.14: ANOVA 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
 
In order to further understand the impact that cooperative research has on patenting and the 
use of formal IPR, we ran a correlation of certain variables. The multiple correlations table 
examines pair wise correlations between the dependent variable i.e., how many patents does 
your company currently have and has it applied for. To add greater visibility for applied 
patents we also include a question on how many patents were applied for in the past 12 
months. These two variables are correlated to three independent variables including a) 
significant market share i.e., regional, country and international markets, b) co-operative 
research and c) litigation i.e., firms were asked whether they were involved in a legal dispute 






Table 4.15: Multiple Correlations 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
 
We find that the more patents a firm has, the more it will patent and this result is highly 
significant (0.544) at the 0.01 level as evident from the correlations table. Further we find that 
market expansion, from regional to country, country to international or regional to 
international, markets, is significantly correlated (at the 0.05 level) to patent use.87 Another 
extremely interesting finding points to the positive and significant correlation between 
geographic dispersion and cooperative research (0.196). Geographic dispersion often takes the 
form of joint ventures or research collaborations which are examples of cooperative research. 
This is an important result because it also captures the OSS world. While the open source 
                                                 
87 As is evident, the value of the significance is negative. We attribute this to a partial correlation analysis which 








community may not be in favor of increased patenting as a result of geographic expansion, 
they would be in favor of increased cooperative research through geographic dispersion as this 
allows technology transfer and increased competition.88 This suggests that the OSS model is 
an example of cooperative research as wel
Though the relationship between cooperative research and the level of patenting is not 
significant, we find that cooperative research is correlated with geographic dispersion 
indicating that cooperative research has a role to play both for IPR and the co-existence 
of proprietary and open source software. 
 
4.5.4 Deployment and development of OSS 
The last factor that we considered in our analysis refers to open source software. Firms were 
asked about their development and deployment of open source software. We separated these 
two issues to examine their individual relationship to the adoption of IPR. The first table 
examines the development of OSS and how it affects the adoption of IPR among SME. The 
descriptives table shows us that only a few firms develop OSS.  
 
Table 4.16: Descriptives 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum 
yes 50 6.26 7.911 1.119 4.02 8.51 1 30 
no 146 12.74 31.152 2.580 7.64 17.84 1 230 
Total 196 11.08 27.294 1.951 7.24 14.93 1 230 
 
The ANOVA table shows us that the between groups mean square is greater than the within 
groups mean square indicating a relationship between the level of patenting and the 
development of OSS. However, the relationship is not significant.  
 
                                                 
88 Thereby we provide evidence to Bitzer and Schroeder’s (2006) boundless cooperation idea of OSS 
development where due to the OSS ethic of free sharing of information, complementary programming skills can 




Table 4.17: ANOVA 
 B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1560.590 1 1560.590 2.098 .149 
Within Groups 143533.889 193 743.699   
Total 145094.479 194    
 
The descriptives table below indicates that many more of the respondents are using OSS in 
comparison to those developing OSS. In the second level of analysis we find a significant 
relationship between the level of patenting and the deployment of open source software. These 
findings indicate that the use of OSS reduces the level of patenting which confirm findings by 
other researchers in the field. Decreased levels of patenting could suggest that market entry is 
easier.  
 
Table 4.18: Descriptives 
B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
yes 85 6.61 7.674 .833 4.95 8.26 1 30 
no 110 14.37 35.427 3.376 7.68 21.06 1 230 
Total 195 10.99 27.321 1.957 7.13 14.85 1 230 
 
Table 4.19: ANOVA 
 B1a: How many patents does your company currently have or has it applied for?  
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2888.408 1 2888.408 3.909 .049 
Within Groups 141872.007 192 738.917   
Total 144760.415 193    
 
Interesting to note here is the fact that there is a relationship between OSS use and 
development and the level of patenting. This indicates that the use of IPR plays an important 
role in the presence of both open and closed systems and could imply increased competition 
If SME deploy OSS, then the number of patents they have is less. Alternatively, if they don’t 
deploy OSS, then they tend to patent more.In addition, we also examined the effect of firm 




to identify whether their firms were very small, small or medium and whether the number of 
employees (turnover) had increased, decreased or remained constant over the last year. 
However, we found that though there was a relationship between these independent factors 
and the level of patenting, the relationship for all of them was insignificant. In the case of 
turnover, perhaps a larger sample size might have resulted in a significant relationship.  
4.6 Conclusions 
Since Schumpeter’s original postulation that large firms are more suited to undertake 
innovative activity, techniques to measure innovative contributions have greatly improved thus 
enabling the visibility of SME and their role in the innovative process. In addition, social and 
economic changes focusing exclusively on SME, (Acs and Audretsch, 2005) have also 
contributed to highlighting the role of SME innovation. It is evident that market structure is 
changing (Jovanovic, 2001) and with it IPR. 
 
The importance of IPR, both formal and informal mechanisms, varies with the sector and the 
firm’s business strategy regarding innovation. Thus, while some SME do patent, informal 
methods still seem to be more effective. It has been suggested in the literature that IPR is 
highly relevant for those industries that revolve around knowledge based activities including 
telecommunications, software, instruments and pharmaceuticals. While there is extensive 
literature within this context for large firms, the evidence for small firms within the same 
context still remains scant.  
 
Our paper focuses on SME within the software, telecommunications and instruments 
industries across Europe and their adoption of IPR based on e- Business watch data. To better 
understand the main determinants of IPR adoption by SME, we make use of analysis of 
variance. Our results provide four insights: First, we find a positive and significant relationship 
between globalization and the level of patenting. This result, to the best of our knowledge, has 
not been covered in the literature thus far. The second new finding refers to the importance of 
cooperative research towards the level of patenting and in geographic dispersion. Thus, higher 
levels of geographic dispersion lead to increased cooperative research. The third result, which 
confirms previous conclusions, shows a significant and positive relationship between legal 
frameworks that aid in the creation of knowledge and innovation and the level of patenting. 
Finally, we find a significant relationship between the use of OSS and the level of patenting 




presence of open and closed systems within the ICT sector. While we were unable to find a 
significant relationship between firm size (very small, small and medium firms) and the level 
of patenting, it is clear that ICT SME are making use of formal IPR. 
 
Our analysis provides a new perspective to the ongoing debate regarding the use of formal and 
informal IP mechanisms by SME. A possible interpretation to the findings in this paper could 
be related to the fact that competition in these markets is inextricably connected to innovation. 
Thus, policy for ICT SME adoption of IPR should focus on enhancing those parts of the legal 
framework which enhance innovation and in encouraging cooperative research which seems to 





                                                
4.7 Appendix I: EBusiness Surveys 
The e-Business watch project was launched by the European Commission in 2001. Its main 
purpose is to monitor adoption, development and the impact of electronic business in different 
sectors across Europe. The data is collected on the basis of representative surveys and 
questions regarding usage and relevance of ICT are questioned in conjunction with general 
background information which includes firm size, sector, country of origin, and number of 
employees. The sample drawn is a random sample of firms from the respective sector 
population in each country. This data is then used to create industry level indicators of ICT 
adoption. 
 
Taking the ICT industry defined by the NACE Rev. 2 classification, the EU 25 has about 
700,000 firms in the ICT industry of which micro enterprises constitute the large bulk of firms 
with the only difference being in ICT manufacturing. The survey for the 2007 project was 
divided in to four parts including sector and topic reports. One of these surveys collected data 
on ICT SME and their IPR adoption patterns upon which the present study is based. The data 
in this study covers the following countries: Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, 
The UK and Ireland where the questionnaires were translated to the language of each 
participating country. In some countries, the target sample was not reached both in terms of 
sectors and size classes. Thus, other countries were used to compensate the sector shortfalls in 
other sectors. In this sample there was a shortfall of firms from Ireland which was 
compensated for by additional interviews in the UK. Problems that occurred were related to 
misinterpretation of various questions which often resulted in firms choosing the ‘don’t know’ 
option. Additionally, trading companies said that they were not concerned with IPR.  
 
2007 was the first year to have a cut off in terms of company size. Only companies with at 
least 10 employees were interviewed in order to examine the impact of micro enterprises in the 
European Union. The universe for this dataset is considered all the companies in the respective 
sectors and company sizes. For the IPR and SME data survey, the minimum requirements for 
each size class were fulfilled (0-9 employees, 10-49 employees and 50-250 employees). 
Samples were drawn locally by fieldwork organisations based on official statistical records 
and widely recognised business directories such as Dun & Bradstreet (used in several 
countries) or Heins und Partner Business Pool.89  
 




The surveys were conducted using the computer aided telephone interview (CATI) method. 
Questions were by and large addressed to those people who were responsible for decisions 
regarding IPR and ICT products within the company. In smaller firms, this tends to be either 
the managing director or the owner. Only those firms either protecting IP or planning to 
protect IP were included in the sample. The only exception was when the company had 
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